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LEGISLATORS SHOULD NOT HAVE 
FEARED TITLE VII PRE-EMPTION OF 
CALIFORNIA'S TEMPORARY TRANSFER 
ALTERNATIVE TO DISCRIMINATORY 
FETAL PROTECTION POLICIES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
California law requires an employerl to temporarily transfer 
a pregnant employee to a less strenuous or hazardous position 
for the duration of her pregnancy if she so requests.2 Legislative 
history demonstrates that the law was specifically designed to 
provide pregnant workers with employment rights during the 
1. In California, an employer is defined as one with five or more employees. See CAL. 
Gov'T CODE § 12926(c) (West 1980 & Supp. 1989) which states: "(c) 'Employer,' except 
as hereinafter provided, includes any person regularly employing five or more persons, or 
any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly; the state or any 
political or civil subdivision thereof and cities." 
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. II, § 7286.5 (1986) (formerly CAL. ADMIN. CODE) states: "(a) 
'Employer.' Any person or individual engaged in any business or enterprise regularly 
employing five or more individuals performing any service under any appointment, con-
tract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written." 
2. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945 (West 1980) states in pertinent part: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless based 
upon a bona fide occupational qualification: 
(c)(l) For an employer who has 11 policy, practice, or col-
lective-bargaining agreement requiring or authorizing the 
transfer of temporarily disabled employees to less strenuous or 
hazardous positions for the duration of the disability to refuse 
to transfer a pregnant female employee who so requests. 
(2) For any employer to refuse to temporarily transfer a 
pregnant female employee to a less strenuous or hazardous po-
sition for the duration of her pregnancy if she so requests, 
with the advice of her physician, where such a transfer can be 
reasonably accommodated, provided, however, that no em-
ployer shall be required by this section to create additional 
employment which the employer would not otherwise have 
created, nor shall such employer be required to discharge any 
employee, transfer any employee with more seniority, or pro-
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course of their pregnancy3 and to alleviate the consequences of 
discriminatory fetal protection policies.' 
Unlike its treatment of a provision granting pregnancy disa-
bility leave,1i California law exempts employers6 subject to the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 [hereinafter title vnp from its transfer 
provisions.s Consequently, transfer provisions in California's 
3. See infra notes 153 through 164 for discussion of legislative history. 
4. See infra note 33 for definition and discussion of fetal protection policies. 
5. The only portion of CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945 which is applicable to title VII 
employers is section (b)(2) regarding mandatory pregnancy disability leave. See infra 
note 142 for text of CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980). The statute has been 
amended twice since its original passage in 1978. 
6. The Equal Employment Opportunities subchapter of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
defines employers [hereinafter title VII employers] as: 
(b) The term "employer" means a person engaged in an indus-
try affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for 
each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in 
the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such 
a person, but such term does not include (1) the United 
States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the 
United States, an Indian tribe, or any department or agency of 
the District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of 
the competitive service (as defined in section 2102 of title 5, or 
(2) a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor 
organization) which is exempt from taxation under section 
501(c) of title 5, except that during the first year after the date 
of enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 
1972, persons having fewer than twenty-five employees (and 
their agents) shall not be considered employers. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). 
7. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [hereinafter title VII] provides in perti-
nent part: 
(a) Employer practices 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, 
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's ... sex ... ; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or appli-
cants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend 
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or oth-
erwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
individual's ... sex .... 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (1982). 
8. See supra note 2 for text of the statutory transfer provisions. The language inval-
idating most of the statute for employers subject to title VII was originally introduced in 
Article 4, Section 4 of A.B. 1960 codified at CAL. LABOR CODE § 1420.35. The section read: 
SEC. 4. In the event Congress enacts legislation amending 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit sex dis-
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statutory scheme are enforceable9 only against those employers 
crimination on the basis of pregnancy, the provisions of this 
act, except paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) of Section 1420.35 
of the Labor Code, shall be inapplicable to any employer sub-
ject to such federal law, except that this section shall not per-
tain to complaints filed prior to the effective date of this act. 
Assembly Bill No. 1960, Amended in Conference, Assembly, August 31, 1978; Senate, 
August 31, 1978 at 6. 
Section four was subsequently amended by A.B. 121, ch., 13 § 1 (1979), to become 
subsection (e) as it exists in its present form. These provisions were codified at CAL. 
LABOR CODE § 1420.35 which was subsequently recodified in 1980 by ch. 992, § 4 (at CAL. 
Gov'T CODE § 12945 (West 1980». 
Throughout this comment, the invalidating subsection will be referred to as subsec-
tion (e) in its codified form and section four when referencing its placement in A.B. 1960. 
9. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945 is interpreted and enforced by the California Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Commission (FEHC). See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12935(a) (West 
1980 & Supp. 1989). The FEHC has promulgated the following regulations which provide 
on-the-job protection for pregnant employees by allowing them to request a transfer: 
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. II, § 7291.l(d)(I)(A) (1982) (formerly CAL. ADMIN. CODE) states 
in part: 
(d) Dangers to Health, Safety, or Reproductive Function. 
(1) If working conditions pose a greater danger to the 
health, safety, or reproductive functions of applicants or em-
ployees of one sex than to individuals of the other sex working 
under the same conditions, the employer or other covered en-
tity shall make reasonable accommodation to: 
(A) Upon the request of an employee of the more endan-
gered sex, transfer the employee to a less hazardous or strenu-
ous position for the duration of the greater danger, unless it 
can be demonstrated that the transfer would impose an undue 
hardship on the employer; .... 
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. II, § 7291.2(d)(2) (1987) (formerly CAL. ADMIN. CODE) states in 
part: 
(2) Transfer to Less Hazardous or Strenuous Positions. 
For an employee temporarily disabled due to pregnancy, 
childbirth or a related medical condition but who is capable of 
working at a less strenuous or hazardous position, the follow-
ing rules apply: 
(A) All Employers with a Transfer Policy. When an em-
ployer has a policy, practice or collective bargaining agreement 
which requires or authorizes the transfer of a temporarily dis-
abled employee to a less hazardous or strenuous position for 
the duration of the disability, it is unlawful for an employer to 
deny the request for an employee temporarily disabled due to 
pregnancy, childbirth or a related medical condition to trans-
fer to a less hazardous or strenuous position. 
(B) Title VII Employers with no Transfer Policy. Where 
an employer has no policy, practice, or collective bargaining 
agreement which requires or authorizes the transfer of a tem-
porarily disabled employee to a less hazardous or strenuous 
3
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who have between five and fourteen employees,lO 
When developing the transfer provisions, California legisla-
tors anticipated that title VII would pre-empt the state's ac-
tion,ll In light of the recent United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,t2 
position for the duration of the disability, it is unlawful for an 
employer to deny the request of an employee disabled by 
pregnancy, childbirth or a related medical condition to trans-
fer to a less hazardous or strenuous position if the employer's 
refusal would have an aduerse impact on the equal employ-
ment opportunities of an employee disabled by pregnancy, 
childbirth or a related medical condition and the refusal is 
not excused by business necessity or a job-relatedness de-
fense .... 
(C) Non-Title VII Employers with no Transfer Policy. 
Where a non-Title VII employer has no policy, practice or col-
lective bargaining agreement which requires or authorizes the 
transfer of a temporarily disabled employee to a less hazard-
ous or strenuous position for the duration of the disability, it 
is unlawful for a non-Title VII employer to refuse to transfer 
an employee disabled by pregnancy, childbirth or a related 
medical condition to a less hazardous or strenuous position for 
the duration of the disability provided that: 
1. The employee requests the transfer; 
2. The employee's request is based on the advice of her 
physician or other licensed health care practitioner; and 
3. Such transfer can be reasonably accommodated by the 
employer. No employer is required to create additional em-
ployment which would not otherwise be created, discharge an-
other employee, transfer another employee with more senior-
ity, or promote another employee who is not qualified to 
perform the job. 
(emphasis added). 
10. See supra note 1 for California's definition of employer. The term "employer" is 
also defined in the CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS which states: "A 'Title VII em-
ployer' is any 'employer,' as that term is defined in Government Code section 12926, 
subdivision (c), and section 7286.5 subdivision (a) of these regulations that is also subject 
to any provision of Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964." CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 
II, § 7291.2(a)(7) (1987) (formerly CAL. ADMIN. CODE). See supra note 6 for federal defi-
nition of employer. 
11. See infra notes 141 through 183 and accompanying text for discussion of the 
legislative history of CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945. Legislative history materials for A.B. 
1960, ch. 1321, § 1 Stats. 1978 and A.B. 121, ch. 13, § 1 Stats. 1979 are now part of the 
Golden Gate University School of Law library collection. These materials were originally 
obtained from the California Secretary of State, California State Archives, 1020 "0" 
Street, Room 130, Sacramento, California 95814. 
12. 479 U.S. 272, 292 (1987) (CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) not pre-empted by title 
VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, as not inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the federal statute, nor does it require the doing of an act which is unlawful 
under title VII). 
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this comment will argue that Congress did not intend to prohibit 
statutory accommodation of an individual pregnant employee's 
right to temporarily transfer from a hazardous work environ-
ment as an alternative to discriminatory fetal protection 
policies. 
Additionally, this comment argues that the California legis-
lature's fear of pre-emption was premature. I3 The legislature 
should amend the statute14 to require compliance by title VII 
employers in order to conform with public policy articulated in 
California Federal and to fulfill the original legislative intent. II! 
This comment recognizes that both male and female work-
ers have a right to work in a toxin-free environment. I6 There are 
environments nevertheless, such as strenuous or hazardousI7 
workplaces, where one may need to consider that certain toxins 
have negative effects on the reproductive capabilities of work-
ers. IS The goal of title VII, equality of employment opportu-
13. See infra notes 120 through 140 and accompanying text for discussion of the 
United States Supreme Court decision in California Federal, 479 U.S. 272 (1987). 
14. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945 (West 1980). When amending the California statute, 
the legislature should delete subsection (e) which provides: "The provisions of this sec-
tion, except paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), shall be inapplicable to any employer sub-
ject to Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964." [d. at (e). 
15. See infra notes 141 through 183 and accompanying text for discussion of legisla-
tive history. 
16. See infra note 83 and accompanying text for discussion of an employer's feder-
ally mandated duty to provide workers with a hazard-free environment. CAL. GOV'T CODE 
§ 12945 was California's attempt to extend this alternative to pregnant workers when the 
environment remained hazardous. See supra notes 159 through 163 and accompanying 
text. 
17. The EEOC Compliance Manual defines a hazardous substance as a "chemical 
compound in any physical state (solid, liquid or gas) or other substance, (e.g., viruses or 
bacteria) that is known to cause or is suspected of causing, short or long term harm to 
individuals exposed to it, or to their offspring." Reproductiue/Fetal Hazards, 92 EEOC 
Compl. Man. (BNA) § 624.2(a) at 624:0001 (July 1986). 
Hazardous physical agent is defined as "anything not a substance or condition that 
is known to cause or is suspected of causing short or long term harm to individuals ex-
posed to it, or to their offspring. Examples include certain types of radiation, heat and 
possibility of extremes of air pressure (such as high or low altitudes)." Reproductiue/ 
Fetal Hazards, 92 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 624.2(b) at 624:0001 (July 1986). 
Hazardous condition is defined as "any physically stressful activity that is known to 
cause or is suspected of causing such harm. There is at present uery little scientific 
euidence as to what actiuities this may include." Reproductiue/Fetal Hazards, 92 EEOC 
Compl. Man. (BNA) § 624.2(c) at 624:0001 (July 1986) (emphasis added). 
The general language of these definitions makes it impossible to avoid discrimina-
tory impact on pregnant employees even when compliance is attempted. 
18. Many commentators are concerned that "different" treatment of pregnant 
5
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nity,19 would not be undermined by accommodating a trait 
unique to women such as pregnancy, through the use of Califor-
nia's mandatory transfer provisions. 
In illustration of the necessity of the right to temporary 
transfer provisions, this comment provides a brief history of em-
ployers' use of discriminatory fetal protection policies against 
pregnant workers.20 Following is a discussion of the inadequacy 
of the federal approach to alleviating pregnancy discrimination 
in the context of hazardous environments, beginning with an ex-
amination of title VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act and including California's Fair Employment and Hous-
ing Commission's disagreement with recent federal case law in 
this area.21 The section includes a discussion of enforcement of 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission22 and Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration.2s The section also critiques the bias in the sci-
entific data upon which the federal system relies to justify and 
analyze employers' use of fetal protection policies.24 The next 
section discusses the impact of federal case law on the Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Commission's enforcement capabilities.21! 
The comment then explores the recent United States Su-
preme Court decision in California Federal. 26 Following, is an 
examination of the legislative history of the California statute 
which provides temporary transfers for pregnant employees in 
hazardous environments.27 In light of California Federal, the 
women in hazardous workplace environments, termed by some to be "preferential," will 
only discourage the scientific and employer communities from studying and remedying 
the effects of exposure to all workers. See Peteros, Pinto, Johnston, "Sorry, you can't 
work here . .. ," SECOND OPINION: COALITION FOR THE MEDICAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN, at 7 
(Oct. 1981). Employers should not be allowed to use fetal protection policies as a pretext 
for discriminating against women, and women must not be forced to choose between 
their health, pregnancy or occupations. 
19. See infra notes 42 through 44 and accompanying text for discussion of the pur-
poses of title VII. 
20. See infra notes 29 through 41 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra notes 42 through 59 and accompanying text; see infra notes 108 
through 112 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 60 through 79 and accompanying text. 
23. See infra notes 80 through 90 and accompanying text. 
24. See infra notes 91 through 107 and accompanying text. 
25. See infra notes 113 through 119 and accompanying text. 
26. See infra notes 120 through 140 and accompanying text. 
27. See infra notes 141 through 183 and accompanying text. 
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comment argues that the California legislature was premature in 
fearing title VII pre-emption. The conclusion asserts that the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act and California statute can coexist 
and argues for the elimination of subsection (e) of CAL. GOV'T 
CODE § 12945.28 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. HISTORY OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PREGNANT WORKERS 
Discrimination based upon an individual's gender has been 
prohibited at the federal level since 1964.29 Discrimination based 
upon pregnancy, a characteristic unique to women, has only 
been federally prohibited since 1978.30 Employees in California 
have a right to freedom from gender discrimination protected 
under the state constitution31 as well as by statute.32 Despite 
28. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945(e) (West 1980) provides: "The provisions of this sec-
tion, except paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), shall be inapplicable to any employer sub-
ject to Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964." 
29. See supra note 7 for text of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (1982). 
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1}-{2) (1982). Congress enacted S. 995, 95th Cong., 2d 
Sess: (Oct. 31, 1978) § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (Pub. L. 95-555). Congressional Record, Proceed-
ings and Debates, Volume 124, Part 28, October 14, 1978 at 38086. The Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act of 1978 (PDA) added subsection (k) to the definition portion of title VII. 
Subsection (k) provides in relevant part: 
(k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" 
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and 
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-re-
lated purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe bene-
fit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in 
their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-
2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise .... 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). 
31. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (West 1980) provides: "A person may not be disqualified 
from entering or pursuing a business, profession, vocation, or employment because of 
sex, race, creed, color, or national or ethnic origin." Acts which violate this clause are 
subject to strict scrutiny. See Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 20, 485 P.2d 529, 541, 
95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 341 (1971) (strict scrutiny used to conclude that sexual classifications 
made with respect to a fundamental interest such as employment, are suspect). 
32. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12921 (West 1980) provides: "The opportunity to seek, obtain 
and hold employment without discrimination because of race, religious creed, color, na-
tional origin, ancestry, physical handicap, medical condition, marital status, sex, or age is 
hereby recognized as and declared to be a civil right." 
Employment protection for pregnant workers is also supplied by CAL. GOV'T CODE 
7
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federal and state prohibitions, discrimination against pregnant 
women persists through employers' use of fetal protection 
policies.33 
§ 12940 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989) which provides in relevant part: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice, unless based 
upon a bona fide occupational qualification, or, except where 
based upon applicable security regulations established by the 
United States or the State of California: 
(a) For an employer, because of the race, religious creed, 
color, national origin, ancestry, physical handicap, medical 
condition, marital status, or sex of any person, to refuse to 
hire or employ the person or to refuse to select the person for 
a training program leading to employment, or to bar or to dis-
charge the person from employment or from a training pro-
gram leading to employment, or to discriminate against the 
person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of 
employment. 
33. Fetal protection or vulnerability policies are measures taken by employers ter-
minating pregnant and fertile women from employment, or excluding them from particu-
lar positions within a company, where such employment is alleged to involve risk of fetal 
injury. Annotation, Exclusion of Women from Employment Involving Risk of Fetal In-
jury as Violative of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e et seq.), 66 
A.LR FED. 968 (1984). 
Many employers have sought to protect fetuses from the dangers of toxic or hazard-
ous work environments, either by totally excluding potential mothers from certain jobs 
or by demanding medical proof of sterilization from women of childbearing age before 
allowing them to work in potentially hazardous jobs. See Williams, Firing the Woman to 
Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportu-
nity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641, 641 n.1, 642 n.7 (1981) [hereinafter Wil-
liams, Firing the Woman]. Fetal protection policies may be implemented regardless of 
the individual woman's desire to have children, her sexual orientation or proof of spousal 
sterilization. See Bertin, Reproductive Hazards in the Workplace, REPRODUCTIVE LAWS 
FOR THE 1990s 277 (S. Cohen & N. Taub eds. 1989) [hereinafter Bertin, Reproductive 
Hazards]. These policies are violative of title VII in that: (1) the policies tend to be 
based on archaic assumptions regarding women's role as child bearers rather than actual 
hazards to fetuses demonstrated by scientific evidence; (2) the policies frequently are 
used as a pretext to keep wom~ from more lucrative parts of the workforce, see Bertin, 
Reproductive Hazards, supra, at 279-82; and (3) the scientific data that is available re-
garding danger to the fetus through parental exposure to toxins shows that paternal 
exposure is also a significant source of danger. See Williams, Firing the Woman, supra, 
at 656-63. 
Employers may have continued to use fetal protection policies because reproductive 
injuries which do not inhibit an individual's ability to work may be excluded by many 
state workers' compensation schemes. However, a child who can prove injury caused by 
his or her parents' work environment may have a cause of action against the employer 
after birth. See Bertin and Henifin, Legal Issues in Women's Occupational Health, 
WOMEN AND WORK: AN ANNUAL REVIEW, Vol. 2, Ch. 4 at 98-99 (A. Stromberg, L. 
Larwood, B. Gutek, eds. 1987) [hereinafter, Bertin, Legal Issues]. These legal impedi-
ments pave the way for employer justification of fetal protection policies. 
The federal Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) has specifically 
acknowledged that "[i]n a number of situations the presence of known or suspected 
hazards has led employers to exclude one or more classes protected by Title VII (usually 
8
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B. DISCRIMINATORY USE OF FETAL PROTECTION POLICIES 
Employment outside the home has been an economic neces-
sity for women since well before the turn of the century.34 Tradi-
tionally, occupations viewed as being exclusively "women's jobs" 
were considered safe despite considerable evidence to the con-
trary.3t! Fetal protection policies are now used throughout the 
country to exclude both pregnant women and women of 
childbearing capacity from jobs traditionally considered male-
dominated.3s Recently employers have also begun to exclude 
women from industries substantially populated by women,37 al-
women) from the workplace because of concern for the health of those employees and/or 
their fetuses or because of concern for liability for lawsuits arising from harm to those 
employees and/or their fetuses." Reproductive/Fetal Hazards, 92 EEOC Com pI. Man. 
(BNA) § 624.1 at 624:0001 (July 1986). 
In this writer's opinion, fetal protection policies should never pass strict scrutiny 
analysis required in California, see supra note 31, because of the inherent bias in the 
medical knowledge and data collection surrounding reproductive health issues. See infra 
notes 91 through 107 and accompanying text for discussion of bias in scientific informa-
tion concerning reproductive health. Consequently, individualized solutions, such as tem-
porary transfer provisions as provided in CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945 (c)(1j-(2) (West 1980) 
must .be mandated. 
34. J. STELLMAN, WOMEN'S WORK. WOMEN'S HEALTH. MYTHS AND REALITIES 7 (1977). 
In 1985, 64 % of all women ages 16 to 64 worked for pay. Of the more than 36 million 
women employed in non-professional occupations, 24 million (67%) worked in female-
dominated jobs (those where 75% or more of the workers were women). Only 11 % of all 
women workers in 1985 were in non-traditional occupations (those in which 75% or more 
of the workers are men). An Overview of Women in the Work Force, NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION ON WORKING WOMEN (1988). Eighty percent of the women who worked outside the 
home in 1983, were in clerical, sales, service, factory or plant jobs. Women constituted 
half of the 12 million workers employed in the nation's plants and factories. Women, 
Work and Health Hazards, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON WORKING WOMEN (1988). 
35. For examples of workplace hazards, see East Bay SftP, Danger: Women's Work, 
SCIENCE FOR THE PEOPLE, March/April 1980. Health workers are exposed to hepatitis, 
back injury from heavy lifting and heat stress. [d. at 8-9. Clerical workers suffer from 
stress and the hazards of poor work space design, leading to back trouble and eye strain. 
[d. at 9-10. Women in the textile industry breathe in cotton fibers, which can produce 
byssinosis, a disabling disease commonly known as "brown lung." [d. at 10-11. Research-
ers have also linked the use of VDTs (video display terminals) to potential for miscar-
riage. [d. at 10. See also McCloud, Pink Collar Blues: Potential Hazards of Video Dis-
play Terminal Radiation, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 139, 150 (1983). 
36. Bertin, Reproductive Hazards, supra note 33, at 278 (manufacturers of semicon-
ductor chips announced plans to limit employment of women). 
37. See id. Use of discriminatory fetal protection policies suggests that women are 
viewed by employers as "marginal" workers, id., whose "rights and interests in employ-
ment must always yield to their paramount responsibility as child bearers." [d. See 
Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1219, 
1232 (1986) ("Employers' associations have asserted as uncontroversial that any inde-
pendent interests women have should yield to the interest of the fetus or potential 
9
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legedly because they fear potential harm to women's reproduc-
tive health or to pregnant employees' fetuses. However, to treat 
all women during their entire working life as "potential breed-
ers" directly violates the clear mandate of title VIps 
Although fetal protection policies purport to protect future 
generations, men are infrequently excluded from hazardous work 
environments.a9 Additionally, exclusion solely of women is pre-
mised on biased scientific information.40 Thus, fetal protection 
fetus.") 
Evidence suggests that most women work for the same reasons men do; to support 
themselves and their families. In 1978, over 42 million women were in the labor force as 
full-time and part-time workers. Forty percent were either single, widowed, separated or 
divorced, tending to suggest that these women worked to support themselves and depen-
dents. See East Bay SftP, Danger: Women's Work, SCIENCE FOR THE PEOPLE, Marchi 
April 1980 at 7. In 1978, nearly two-thirds of the women in the labor force worked to 
support themselves and their families, or to supplement low family incomes. Women's 
Bureau, U.S. Department of Labor, Economic Responsibilities of Working Women, 
(Washington, D.C., Sept. 1979) at 1. The average American woman will bear only two 
children. Most working women plan the timing of those births, and many blue-collar 
women bear children early in life, before going to work. Bertin, Reproductive Hazards, 
supra note 33, at 279 (citing U.S. Bureau of the Census, Dep't of Commerce, Current 
Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 325, "Fertility of American Women: June 1977," 
Table B, at 3 (1978)). 
38. Many women prevent pregnancy through the use of birth control, have spouses 
who are infertile, intentionally choose sterilization or use a host of other family planning 
methods. See Bertin, Reproductive Hazards, supra note 33, at 279 ("[c]oncern for spe-
cific workplace effects on pregnancy cannot rationally be directed at the entire female 
workforce, and women cannot be viewed as permanently potentially pregnant or as pow-
erless to control conception and childbirth.") See supra note 7 for text of title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I)-(2) (1982); see also infra 
notes 50 through 79 for discussion of the Equal Employment Opportunities Commis-
sion's application of title VII. 
39. Men's offspring are also subject to potential harm. See Bertin, Reproductive 
Hazards, supra note 33, at 281-82 (not only are men not excluded, when harm to their 
reproductive capacity is caused by a hazard, the hazard is usually banned). See infra 
notes 97 and 98 and accompanying text for further discussion of harm to men's repro-
ductive capabilities. 
40. See infra notes 91 through 107 and accompanying text for discussion of bias in 
scientific information. 
In Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital, 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir.) (citing Williams, 
Firing the Woman, supra note 33, at 661), reh'g denied, 732 F.2d 944 (11th Cir. 1984) 
the Eleventh Circuit in dicta noted: 
[A]t present there is, even within the scientific community, a 
certain amount of subtle bias that has focused research on 
the hazardous effects of workplace substances as they pertain 
to reproductive health on women more so than men . ... In 
those instances in which scientific evidence points to a hazard 
to women, but no scientific evidence exists regarding men, an 
employer may be allowed to adopt a suitable policy aimed 
10
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policies realistically operate as effective means of excluding 
women from multiple facets of the workforce.41 
III. FEDERAL LAW - WHY IT FAILS TO BE SUFFICIENT 
A. TITLE VII AS AMENDED BY THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION 
ACT 
Congress enacted title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196442 
only women. As additional research on men becomes available, 
however, the employer must adjust its policy or risk running 
afoul of Title VII. 
Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548-49 (emphasis added). With dicta such as this, title VII employ-
ers will never have any incentive to seek out medical research on men. 
A recent report prepared by the American Medical Association to heighten physi-
cians' awareness about the circumstances associated with reproductive health of workers 
is also quite telling: 
The advice given by generations of physicians regarding work 
during normal pregnancy has historically been more the result 
of social and cultural beliefs about the nature of pregnancy 
(and of pregnant women) than the result of any documented 
medical experience with pregnancy and work. In attempting to 
review the available literature on the effect of gestation on 
ability to work, it is impressive to realize how few of our stan-
dard medical beliefs about the physical and emotional charac-
teristicsof pregnancy have any scientific basis. 
Effects of Pregnancy on Work Performance, JAM.A., Vol. 251, No. 15 at 1995 (Apr. 20, 
1984). 
Even if title VII employers did attempt to seek out research on effects of male expo-
sure, there is little reliable data available due in part to the longstanding bias that repro-
duction is solely a women's health issue. See infra notes 91 through 107. 
41. See Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1219 (1986) (comparing contemporary fetal protection policies to sex-specific pro-
tectionist legislation of the early twentieth century). Fetal protection policies appear to 
be based upon the following stereotypical ideas about women's role in society: (1) All 
women are potential mothers; (2) protecting the embryo or fetus is paramount to pro-
tecting the lives of women; (3) women are totally responsible for reproduction and 
parenting, and are economically dependent upon men. See Peteros, Pinto, Johnston, 
"Sorry, you can't work here . .. ," SECOND OPINION: COALITION FOR THE MEDICAL RIGHTS 
OF WOMEN, at 6 (Oct. 1981). 
For a particularly egregious example of the endorsement of the use of fetal protec-
tion policies, see Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'! Union v. American Cyanamid 
Co., 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984), (Bork, J.) where the court announced that a com-
pany's policy of requiring women to undergo voluntary sterilization procedures in order 
to keep their jobs was not a "hazard" for purposes of the Occupational Health & Safety 
Act of 1970, § 5(a)(I), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1982). Five women submitted 
to surgical sterilization to keep their jobs, and one year later the department in which 
they worked was closed, allegedly for "business reasons". See also Bertin, Reproductive 
Hazards, supra note 33, at 278. 
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I)-(2) (1982). 
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for the express purpose of prohibiting employment discrimina-
tion, including employment discrimination based on sex.43 In en-
acting title VII, Congress required the removal of artificial, arbi-
trary and unnecessary barriers to employment which operated to 
invidiously discriminate on the basis of impermissible classifica-
tions,H including sex. 
In response to the United States Supreme Court's holding 
in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,.D Congress found it necessary 
to expand its definition of sex discrimination46 and enacted the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 [hereinafter PDA]:" Like 
43. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 276-77 (1987). Refer-
ring to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Senator Williams, the sponsor of Senate Bill 
S. 995 stated: 
The hallmark of title VII, and of this legislation, is that it 
would require that all American workers be treated fairly by 
their employers, without regard to their sex, except insofar as 
it would affect their ability or inability to work. Any kind of 
arbitrary classification ... has no place in this legislation. 
[d. (citing 123 Congo Rec. 15047 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1977)). 
44. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). The Court held that a com-
pany could not as a condition for employment require black employees to have a high 
school degree or pass a standardized intelligence test. Neither criteria could be shown to 
be related to successful job performance and both operated to disqualify blacks at a rate 
disproportionately higher than whites. [d. at 425-26. The Court clarified that Congress' 
objective in enacting title VII was "to achieve equality of employment opportunities and 
remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group" of employ-
ees over another. [d. at 429-30. 
45. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The majority opinion written by Justice Rehnquist held 
that an otherwise comprehensive disability insurance plan did not violate title VII even 
though it failed to cover pregnancy related disabilities. [d. at 145-46. The Court reasoned 
that since "there is no proof that the package is in fact worth more to men than to 
women, it is impossible to find any gender-based discriminatory effect in this scheme ... 
. " [d. at 138. The dissent stated that the plan covered men for all categories of risk but 
gave women only partial prote<j;ion, and was thus exactly the type of discrimination 
based on gender which title VII ~eant to avoid. [d. at 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The 
dissenting Justices' opinion provided the legal basis for subsequent passage of the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act. California Federal, 479 U.S. at 277 n.6. 
46. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 (1983). 
There, the Court held that in denying pregnancy benefits to the wives of male employ-
ees, the employer's health plan violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act by unlawfully 
giving married male employees' dependents a benefit package that was less inclusive 
than the dependency coverage provided to married female employees. [d. at 685. 
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). The Pregnancy Discrimination Act unambiguously 
demonstrated that Congress agreed with both the holding and reasoning announced by 
the dissent in Gilbert. See Newport News, 462 U.S. at 678-79. "[Ilt seems only common 
sense, that since only women can become pregnant, discrimination against pregnant peo-
ple is necessarily discrimination against women, and that forbidding discrimination 
based on sex therefore clearly forbids discrimination based on pregnancy.") [d. at n.17 
(quoting 123 Congo Rec. 10581) (1977) (remarks of Rep. Hawkins). 
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the California legislature,48 Congress overrode the Gilbert deci-
sion49 and explicitly stated that impermissible sex discrimina-
tion included discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.GO 
As interpreted'H and enforced,G2 the PDAG3 fails to ade-
quately prevent discrimination against women who continue to 
work in hazardous workplace environmentsG4 when their preg-
48. See infra notes 154 and 155 and accompanying text. 
49. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676. 
50. Id. at 677-78. 
51. For analysis purposes the United States Supreme Court has broken the critical 
first sentence of the PDA into two phrases. See Newport News, 478 U.S. at 678 n.14. 
To illustrate, the phrases are as follows: 
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" in-
clude, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; 
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medi-
cal conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe 
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar 
in their ability or inability to work .... 
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982) (emphasis added). 
The meaning of the second phrase of the PDA provides a source of debate. Some 
argue that its clear language means that women should be treated exactly the same as 
other people who are unable to work and that the second phrase limits the meaning of 
the first. Others argue that through the second phrase, Congress intended merely to il-
lustrate remedies for pregnancy discrimination. See Furnish, Beyond Protection: Rele-
vant Differences and Equality in the Toxic Work Environment, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 
4-6 (1987). 
The Supreme Court has held that the second phrase is explanatory only and does 
not limit the meaning of the first phrase. The Court stated "[t]he meaning of the first 
clause [of the PDA] is not limited by the specific language in the second clause, which 
explains the application of the general principle to women employees." Newport News, 
462 U.S. at 678 n.14. 
California Federal, 479 U.S. 272 (1987), resolved the debate in favor of those who 
argue that the second phrase of the PDA is merely illustrative and does not prohibit 
accommodation of pregnancy as a characteristic unique to women. See id. at 285. 
52. The Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) has recently 
promulgated federal guidelines on fetal protection policies, EEOC's Policy Guidance on 
Reproductive and Fetal Hazards, (BNA) No. 193, D-l to D-4 (Oct. 5, 1988) [hereinafter 
EEOC fetal protection guidelines]. See infra notes 60 through 79 for critique of the 
guidelines' analysis. 
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). 
54. Industries associated with reproductive toxic effects to both men and women 
include: agriculture, anesthesia, construction (builders and painters), degreasing, drug 
. manufacturing, dry cleaning, electrical power, leather, oil and gasoline refining and re-
tailing, painting and dyeing, plastics and polymer manufacturing, smelting, synthetic 
chemistry and textile manufacturing. See Pregnancy and Employment: The Complete 
Handbook on Discrimination, Maternity Leave, and Health & Safety, (BNA) at 75-87 
[hereinafter BNA Pregnancy and Employment]. 
See generally Buttrey, Ergonomics/Physical Energy Conditions, GUIDELINES ON 
13
Norton: Employment Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1989
476 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:463 
nancy is not technically disabling.lui Likening pregnancy to a 
"temporary disability," as do federal li6 and stateli7 statutes and 
regulations, tends to stigmatize women.1i8 Allowing employers to 
focus on pregnancy as analogous to an illness draws attention 
away from the need to improve safety in work environments 
which present potential harm to the reproductive health of all 
workers/,9 Tolerance of fetal protection policies prevents title 
PREGNANCY AND WORK (1977); Brix, Environmental and Occupational Hazards to the 
Fetus, 27 J. REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE 577 (Sept. 1982). 
55. A pregnancy is technically disabling when a woman is unable to adequately per-
form her job. However, it is important to note that the state of pregnancy is infrequently 
disabling and is not an illness. 
56. Pregnancy disability, defined as the ability or inability to work due to pregnancy 
related conditions, is a circumstance which is protected from employment discrimina-
tion. See supra note 30. The PDA incorporated language focused on pregnancy as a disa-
bility due to its historical context as a Congressional response to General Electric Co. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (pregnancy disability insurance). See supra notes 45 to 50 
and accompanying text. 
Although the United States Supreme Court has found the second phrase of the PDA 
to be illustrative in nature, see infra notes 125 and 126, effectiveness of the PDA for 
pregnant workers remaining in hazardous workplaces has been limited by analyzing 
pregnancy discrimination with the pre-existing and iII-t1tting legal terminology and 
guidelines used for employees with disabilities. In reality, for many employees pregnancy 
does not result in an inability to work (except, of course, during the delivery period). 
Such limited analysis is underinclusive in situations where pregnant women need protec-
tion from hazardous workplaces, without being subject to employer discrimination. 
57. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7291.2(a) (1987) (formerly CAL. ADMIN. CODE) states in 
part: 
(1) A woman is "disabled by pregnancy, childbirth or a 
related medical condition" if in the opinion of her own doctor 
or other licensed health care practitioner she is unable because 
of pregnancy, childbirth or a related medical condition to per-
form the essential duties of her job or to perform these duties 
without undue risk to herself or other persons. 
(2) A woman is "affected by pregnancy, childbirth or re-
lated medical condiit.,ions" if she is pregnant, in childbirth or 
has a related medical condition, or is so perceived, whether or 
not she is disabled by any of these conditions. 
58. This perspective also has the deleterious effect of equating all pregnancy in the 
workplace with disability, using legal frameworks developed for temporary disabilities, 
instead of dealing with the condition of pregnancy as a separate, unique and permanent 
facet of the workforce. 
The disability language in the second phrase of the PDA has a potentially chilling 
effect on the adoption of statutory alternatives, such as mandatory transfer upon request 
provisions, to employers' use of fetal protection policies in toxic work environments. CAL. 
GOv'T CODE § 12945 (West 1980) is exemplary of this effect. In anticipation of the pas-
sage of the PDA, the California legislators voluntarily invalidated most of the statute as 
it applied to employers subject to title VII. See infra notes 165 through 183 and accom-
panying text. 
59. Pregnant workers in hazardous environments frequently have no disability or 
inability to perform their job tasks. Rather, it is the work environment itself which is 
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VII employers from planning for and accommodating pregnancy 
as a permanent facet of the workplace. 
B. ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VII AND THE PDA 
1. EEOC Standards and Enforcement 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
is the agency charged with enforcing title VII.60 In early October 
1988, the EEOC announced its long-awaited Policy Guidance on 
Reproductive and Fetal Hazards [hereinafter EEOC fetal pro-
tection guidelines].61 The Commission's newly articulated posi-
tion on fetal protection concludes that employer policies which 
exclude women from workplaces constitute per se violations of 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.62 However, the EEOC contin-
ues to allow limited use of fetal protection policies and justifies 
such use as serving a dual public policy purpose.63 
"sick". 
60. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 - 2000e-5 (1982); see also Reproductiue/Fetal Hazards, 
92 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 624.3 at 624:0003 (July 1986) which states: 
Limited Role of Commission - In investigating charges 
under this manual section, the EOS should keep in mind that 
it is not the Commission's role to implement or enforce federal 
laws related to health and safety in the workplace. This role 
remains with the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion and other federal and state agencies specifically granted 
that responsibility. Rather, the Commission's responsibility is 
to assure equality of employment opportunity. Title VII only 
applies when an employer has a policy or practice of excluding 
from the workplace one group protected by Title VII and not 
another .... 
61. EEOC fetal protection guidelines, supra note 52, at D-2. The Commission had 
proposed earlier standards, but abandoned them for a case-by-case analysis in 1981. [d. 
For criticism of the EEOC's inaction in this area, see Timko, Exploring the Limits of 
Legal Duty: A Union's Responsibilities With Respect to Fetal Protection Policies, 23 
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 159, 172-74 (1986) [hereinafter Timko, Exploring the Limits) (EEOC 
abandoned ineffective proposed guidelines in 1981, deciding to review fetal protection 
policies on a case-by-case basis); BNA Pregnancy and Employment, supra note 54, at 25 
(Augustus Hawkins, Chairman, Committee on Housing, Education and Labor, wrote the 
EEOC in 1987 requesting an explanation for the EEOC's reluctance to issue regulations 
on reproductive hazards discrimination). 
62. Since the passage of the PDA, a pregnancy-based rule, such as a fetal protection 
policy, can never be facially "neutral". Thus, if the plaintiff shows that the rule is preg-
nancy-based, she has made out a prima facie case of discrimination. Hayes v. Shelby 
Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1547-48 (11th Cir. 1984). See also EEOC fetal protec-
tion guidelines, supra note 52, at D-1. 
63. The EEOC's articulated policy is to prevent "unnecessary limitations on 
women's employment opportunities, while preserving the employers' (and society's) legit-
15
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The new EEOC fetal protection guidelines purport to give 
guidance for analyzing cases where employers have implemented 
fetal protection policies which limit women's, but not men's, em-
ployment opportunities.64 In reality, the new EEOC guidelines 
do little more than affirm the pre-existing federal case law anal-
ysis used in evaluating discriminatory employer practices.6~ 
imate interest in protecting the health of offspring." EEOC fetal protection guidelines, 
supra note 52, at D-l. 
64. [d. The EEOC purports to scrutinize use of fetal protection policies because the 
policies interfere with the employment opportunities of women, a class of workers pro-
tected by title VII. [d. 
To effectively evaluate fetal protection policies, the EEOC requires the following 
information: 
[d. at D-2. 
(1) the nature of the specific toxic or other hazllrd(s) that ex-
ist(s) in the workplace; 
(2) scientific evidence relating to the existence or nonexistence 
of a substantial risk of fetlll or reproductive harm through the 
exposure of pregnant or fertile female employees or male em-
ployees to the hazard, including informlltion from the OCCUPII-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Na-
tionlll Institute of Occuplltional SlIfety and Hellith (NIOSH), 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC), or other federal agencies; 
(3) the specific time period during which exposure to the toxic 
substance or other hazard will clluse harm; 
(4) alternative methods of protection from the hazard, and 
whether they have been utilized by the employer; 
(5) whether the employer's policy is under- or over-inclusive, 
i.e., whether there are employees who are being excluded from 
the workplace who need not be excluded or whether there are 
employees who are exposed to hazards who should be 
protected; 
(6) evidence as to the effectiveness of the employer's exclu-
sionary policy; 
(7) whether the employer is complying with IIpplicable federal, 
state, or local occupational safety and health lllws; 
(8) whether the collective bargaining agreement contains pro-
visions which may be relevant to the issue of less discrimina-
tory alternatives; and 
(9) what information employees have been given about the po-
tential hazards. 
65. The analysis has previously been articulated by three United States Circuit 
Courts of Appeals which have addressed the issue of the discriminatory effects of fetal 
protection policies. See Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(giving new meaning to the business necessity defense); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 
1172, 1184 (4th Cir. 1982), vacated, 767 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1984) (first case to discuss 
fetal protection issues and to announce a framework for anlllysis of claims purported to 
be violative of title VII of the Civil Rights Act. of 1964); Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 
Kingsville, Tex., 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982). Hayes and Zuniga involved x-ray techni-
cians who were fired once they becllme pregnllnt. Both employers claimed thllt their pur-
16
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The analysis used by the federal courts and adopted by the 
EEOC allows an employer that has implemented a fetal protec-
tion policy to assert the business necessity defense66 if it can 
show its discriminatory practice is necessary for "safe and effi-
cient job performance."67 The EEOC fetal protection guidelines 
solidify an employer's opportunity to utilize the business neces-
sity defense, despite the fact that the bona fide occupational 
qualification (BFOQ) defense68 has traditionally been the only 
pose in firing the women was to protect the women's unborn children from the poten-
tially detrimental effect of x-ray radiation. The fifth and eleventh circuits both found 
that the employers' policies were based on unsupported assumptions about risks, rather 
than scientific data. See Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1550-52; Zuniga, 692 F.2d at 992-94. 
Recently the Seventh Circuit considered International Union, UA W v. Johnson Con-
trols, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989) and found plaintiff UA W had failed to carry its 
burden of persuasion that the employer should not be able to utilize a business necessity 
defense. 
66. "Business necessity" was redefined as the existence of an overriding legitimate 
business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of 
the business. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1552 n.14. Traditionally, this defense has been narrowly 
used to uphold employer policies related to job performance. The problem in the fetal 
protection context is that fetal protection does not, in a strict sense, have anything to do 
with actual job performance. [d. at 1552. The Eleventh Circuit chose to give the defense 
broader meaning, with its sweeping statement, "we simply recognize fetal protection as a 
legitimate area of employer concern to which the business necessity defense extends." 
Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1552 n.14 (11th Cir. 1984). 
Under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act "business necessity" fol-
lows the old title VII analysis and is only available where a facially neutral employment 
policy has a discriminatory impact on a protected class. City and County of San Fran-
cisco v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 191 Cal. App. 3d 976, 985-86, 236 Cal. Rptr. 
716, 721-22, rev. dismissed, (1987). The California Fair Employment and Housing Com-
mission (FEHC) has refused to apply the "business necessity" defense in fetal protection 
cases. The FEHC has stated, "[ilt is readily apparent that respondent's FPP, which ap-
plies only to women and excludes only women, is ... an overtly discriminatory practice. 
As such, the 'business necessity' defense is totally inapposite to this case and is unavaila-
ble as a defense to defendant's conduct." Dep't of Fair Employment & Hous. v. Globe 
Battery, FEHC Dec. No. 87-19 at 11 (1987). See also Dep't of Fair Employment & Hous. 
Comm'n v. Interstate Brands Corp., FEHC Dec. No. 78-05 at 17 n.11 (1979). 
67. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1552 n.14. 
68. The BFOQ defense is available only when an employer can show that the "ex-
cluded class is unable to perform the duties that constitute the essence of the job." 
Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1549. Title VII defines these duties as reasonably "necessary to the 
normal operation of the particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982). 
In California, the BFOQ defense is narrowly construed and the burden is on the 
employer to establish the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. See Bohemian 
Club v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 187 Cal. App. 3d I, 18-23, 231 Cal. Rptr. 
769, 799-83 (1986), appeal dismissed, 484 U.S. 805 (1987); County of Alameda v. Fair 
Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 153 Cal. App. 3d 499, 505, 200 Cal. Rptr. 381, 384 (1984). 
The FEHC has refused to allow the BFOQ defense to be used to justify a fetal 
protection policy where there was "some evidence in the record of potential risk to the 
fetuses and offspring of male, as well as female, workers who are exposed to lead .... " 
Dep't of Fair Employment & Hous. v. Globe Battery, FEHC Dec. No. 87-19 at 10 (1987) 
17
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available defense in cases of overt discrimination.69 
The EEOC guidelines prohibit employers from "establishing 
policies that exclude from the workplace members of one sex but 
not the other because of a reproductive or fetal hazard, unless 
that policy can be justified by reputable objective evidence of 
an essentially scientific nature."70 Proof that harm to fetuses 
occurs through the mother and not the father must be satisfied 
by "substantial evidence" before an employer may exclude em-
ployees of one sex from the workplace.71 Theoretically, workers 
may then be excluded only to the extent necessary to protect 
their offspring from reproductive or fetal hazards.72 However, 
the term "substantial evidence" is not satisfactorily defined.73 
This lack of definition impairs the EEOC fetal protection guide-
lines' ability to provide effective prevention and to eliminate dis-
criminatory employer action allegedly supported by scientific 
(emphasis in original). 
69. EEOC fetal protection guidelines, ,qupra note 52, at D-l. The court in Hayes 
found that the potential for fetal harm, unless it adversely affects a mother's job per-
formance, is irrelevant to the BFOQ issue, and that therefore the defense did not apply 
to cases concerning fetal protection policies. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 
at 1548. 
70. EEOC fetal protection guidelines, supra note 52, at D-1 (citing Hayes, 726 F.2d 
at 1548) (emphasis added). See infra notes 91 through 107 and accompanying text for 
discussion of lack of objectivity and reliability in the scientific evidence available to 
OSHA when formulating these standards. 
71. See EEOC fetal protection guidelines, supra note 52, at D-l. Under the new 
EEOC fetal protection guidelines, the issues the Commission will address when analyzing 
a potentially discriminatory fetal protection policy are: (1) whether there exists a sub-
stantial risk of harm to employees' offspring through the exposure of employees to a 
reproductive or fetal hazard in the workplace; (2) whether the harm to employees' off-
spring takes place through the exposure of employees of one sex but not employees of 
the opposite sex; and (3) whether the employer's policy effectively eliminates the risk of 
fetal or reproductive harm. Id. 
72. Id. If there is a reasonable alternative policy which would provide the same pro-
tection with a less discriminatory impact, the employers' policy will not survive scrutiny. 
Id. The reality in California is, however, that employers provide pregnant workers with 
lists of chemicals used in the workplace. Women then must take the lists to their doctors 
to get approval to continue working in the environment. If the doctor will not give ap-
proval, the woman loses her job. Consequently, many women who cannot afford to lose 
their jobs continue to work in dangerous environments. Statements by Alicia N. Orosco, 
Emerging Issues in Environmental Law, Twentieth National Conference on Women in 
the Law, (Mar. 30 - Apr. 2, 1989) (discussing the electronics industry in "Silicon Valley" 
Santa Clara County, California). 
73. See EEOC fetal protection guidelines, supra note 52, at D-1 (EEOC provides no 
definition of "substantial evidence"). Without a standard for measuring how much evi-
dence is "substantial" it seems truly impossible for any court or employer to achieve 
consistent r~sults. 
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evidence. 
There is yet another defective aspect of the new EEOC fetal 
protection guidelines. The Commission has determined that 
should it find inconclusive evidence regarding risk of fetal or re-
productive harm through male employees, even if due to the 
"paucity of research,"74 it will proceed as if a determination had 
been made that the risks in question were substantially confined 
to female employees.71i A cycle of justifiable discrimination is 
therefore created by reliance on biased scientific information. 
The analysis developed by federal circuit courts and 
adopted in the EEOC fetal protection guidelines scrutinizes an 
employer's policy only after a pregnant woman has been imper-
missibly excluded from the workplace. Consequently, the first 
pregnant woman to experience discrimination due to an em-
ployer's fetal protection policy will be required to litigate to ob-
tain the right to discrimination-free employment which she is 
guaranteed by title VII76 in the first place.77 
In practice, the federally promulgated guidelines may influ-
ence California employers who are excused from compliance 
74. [d. at D-2. 
75. [d. 
76. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) 
(1982) provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Employer Practices 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer -
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or appli-
cants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend 
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or oth-
erwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
individual's ... sex .... 
77. The plaintiff's burden has been made even more onerous by the Supreme 
Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. __ , __ , 109 
S.Ct. _, __ , 104 L.Ed.2d 733, 750 (1989) (statistically demonstrated racial imbal-
ance in one segment of an employer's workforce was insufficient to establish a prima 
facie case of disparate impact with respect to selection of workers for other positions). In 
Wards Cove, the Court found that a plaintiff employee must establish not only that an 
employer's practice has a prima facie disparate impact, but that the impact was caused 
by the employer's practice and not some other societal factor. [d. at 750-51 (quoting 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. __ , __ , 108 S.Ct. 2777, __ , 101 
L.Ed.2d 827, 845 (1989) ("the plaintiff is in our view responsible for isolating and identi-
fying the specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed 
statistical disparities. ") 
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with CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1294578 to ignore available scientific evi-
dence regarding harm to the reproductive health of both sexes 
until a victim has the ability to challenge the discriminatory ex-
clusionary policies.79 
2. OSHA Standards and Enforcement 
The fetal protection guidelines recently promulgated by the 
EEOC80 instruct federal courts to defer to Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA)81 when evaluating scientific 
evidence provided by litigants attempting to prove that a fetus 
will suffer harm as a result of parental exposure to toxic or haz-
ardous conditions.82 The EEOC's permissive approach in al-
lowing employers to utilize defenses based oil biased scientific 
evidence fails to give meaningful consideration to the fact that 
women, as well as men, are guaranteed safe working conditions 
78. See infra note 142 for text of CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945 (West 1980). 
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945(e) effectively excuses title VII employers from complying 
with the transfer provisions and permits them to follow the less stringent federal guide-
lines. See supra notes 60 through 79 for critique of the new EEOC fetal protection 
guidelines. 
79. See generally Johnson Controls v. California Fair Employment & Hous. 
Comm'n, No. G007029 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. filed 1988) (Globe Battery refused to hire a 
woman for job in lead battery plant in Fullerton, California because she would not pro-
vide medical proof of sterility). 
80. The EEOC's recently promulgated guidelines are to be used in evaluating claims 
of pregnancy discrimination based on an employer's use of a fetal protection policy. See 
EEOC fetal protection guidelines, supra note 52, at D-l to D-4. 
81. The federal government looks to the Occupational Health & Safety Administra-
tion to set exposure limits for hazardous workplace conditions. The Occupational Safety 
and Health Act (OSHA) codified at 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (1982), established the Occupa-
tional Health Review Commission to set these standards. Unfortunately, to date OSHA 
has only set three standards regarding reproductive hazards. See infra note 87 and ac-
companying text. 
82. EEOC fetal protection guidelines, supra note 52, at D-2. Unfortunately, OSHA 
has not been effectively enforced by federal courts in the past to protect women from 
discriminatory fetal protection policies. See Bertin, Reproductive Hazards, supra note 
33, at 282-84. See, e.g., Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. American Cyan-
amid Co., 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984), where OSHA determined that a fetal protection 
policy which required women to provide proof of sterilization in order to keep their jobs 
was a workplace hazard, but the circuit court held that work "hazard" in the general 
duties clause of the OSH Act was intended to cover only physical workplace conditions, 
that it could not be stretched to reach the consequences of a fetal protection policy, and 
therefore, the employer's policy of requiring women to show proof of sterilization to keep 
their jobs was not a "hazard" within the meaning of the Act. [d. at 450. See OCCUPA-
TIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW, 126-27 (S. Bokat, H. Thompson, III eds. 1988) (discuss-
ing the American Cyanamid decision). 
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through the "general duty clause" of OSHA.83 
OSHA has been largely unsuccessful84 in ensuring "safe and 
healthful working conditions ... to preserve ... human re-
sources"85 since its enactment. Of over 77,000 chemicals in use in 
American workplaces, OSHA has set exposure limits for approx-
imately 400 and has set specific comprehensive standards for 
only twenty-eight toxic substances.86 OSHA has promulgated 
only three health standards concerning reproductive hazards 
caused by lead, ethylene oxide and dibromochloropropane 
(DBCP).87 
In part due to the existence of workers' compensation laws 
in most states, employers have little incentive to comply with 
OSHA to prevent workplace injury and illness.88 It is frequently 
less expensive for employers to ignore OSHA standards than to 
comply with them because the chance of being caught is low.8o 
83. The Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1982), requires em-
ployers to "furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment 
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or 
serious physical harm to his employees." 
Under OSHA, employers are required "to adhere to mandatory safety and health 
standards and to assume a general duty of ensuring workplace safety." See Timko, Ex-
ploring the Limits, supra note 61, at 168. 
The OSHA general duty clause requires that an employer must do everything feasi-
ble to reduce recognized hazards. Commentators argue that the phrase "to reduce recog-
nized hazards" imposes a general duty on employers to protect workers against techno-
logically preventable harms. Others have unsuccessfully argued that fetal protection 
policies are themselves hazards. Id. at 170-7l. 
Use of fetal protection policies allows employers to ignore their obligations to elimi-
nate hazardous work conditions which are dangerous to the reproductive capabilities of 
both men and women. Fetal protection policies do not sufficiently protect male workers 
from reproductive hazards, nor do they protect workers from hazards unrelated to their 
reproductive ability. Id. at 170. Commentators are unaware of similar policies which ex-
clude men from workplaces which may cause them to unwittingly injure their offspring. 
In fact, once there is proof that a chemical is harmful to the reproductive health of men, 
the chemical is usually banned. See Bertin, Reproductive Hazards, supra note 33, at 
281-82. 
84. See Bertin, Legal Issues, supra note 33, at 93, 99-1Ol. 
85. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982). 
86. See BNA Pregnancy and Employment, supra note 54, at 68. 
87. Id. In 1977, male workers at an Occidental Chemical Company plant in Califor-
nia reported an unusually low birth rate in their families. Testing showed that 14 of 25 
men were either sterile or had extremely low sperm counts. All the affected men had 
worked with dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a pesticide. Subsequently, DBCP was 
banned for almost all uses. See Bertin, Reproductivl! Hazards, supra note 33, at 280. 
88. See Bertin, Legal Issues, supra note 33, at 99-100. 
89. Id. at 100. 
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Even if employers are cited, the penalty may be insignificant in 
comparison to the costs of correcting the hazard.90 
OSHA has been ineffective in requiring employers to clean 
up toxic environments in order to protect the reproductive 
health of female and male workers and their offspring. OSHA 
has failed to set standards which protect pregnant women who 
remain in hazardous workplaces. The EEOC's reliance on OSHA 
standards therefore provides inadequate scrutiny of employers' 
discriminatory fetal protection policies. 
3. Scientific Evidence 
The approach recently condoned by the EEOC allows em-
ployers to continue to use fetal protection policies subject to cer-
tain limitations.91 An employer may present scientific evidence 
which "proves" that potential harm to the fetus occurs through 
women only, and not through men, as a defense to its use of 
fetal protection policies.92 However, the use of fetal protection 
policies justified by gender-biased scientific evidence is inconsis-
tent with the EEOC's articulated purposes.93 It is, therefore, im-
portant to understand the nature of the bias in current scientific 
data.94 
90. Id. In 1983, the average proposed penalty was only $172 for those companies 
cited for serious violations (those that create a "substantial probability [of) death or 
serious physical harm"). Id. (citing Office of Technology Assessment, Preventing Illness 
and Injury in the Workplace at 235-36 (1984)). 
91. See EEOC fetal protection guidelines, supra note 52, at D-l. 
92. See id. at D-1 to D-2. Again, note that this occurs only after a woman has exper-
ienced discrimination and has filed a complaint with the EEOC. See EEOC fetal protec-
tion guidelines, supra note 52, at D-2. There is little enforceable protection which is 
preventative in nature at the federal level before a pregnant woman loses her job. The 
EEOC Compliance Guidelines suggest that an employer may allow a pregnant worker to 
transfer, but these provisions are not mandatory. See Reproductive/Fetal Hazards, 92 
EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 624.7(i) at 624:0009 (July 1986). 
93. See supra notes 61 through 64 and accompanying text. Fetal protection policies 
which exclude pregnant women or women of childbearing capacity from the workplace 
fail to adequately protect future generations because the scientific evidence under which 
they are scrutinized is inherently gender biased. 
94. See generally Working Women: Occupational Health Issues of the 1980s, Con-
ference Report, Northwest Center for Occupational Health and Safety, Univ. of Wash-
ington (Apr. 19-20, 1988) (conference report compiles several scientific and legal articles 
relevant to women's occupational health issues) (available at Golden Gate University 
School of Law library). 
The EEOC itself has conceded that "[u)ntil recently, there has been little research 
on the direct effects of many of these substances [chemicals, radiation, etc.l, conditions, 
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The bulk of available scientific research concerning repro-
ductive health relies on the archaic stereotype that fetal health 
is solely a function of maternal exposure.911 While there is no dis-
pute that exposure to some toxins may cause permanent damage 
to a woman's reproductive health or to her fetus,96 men are also 
and physical agents on workers exposed to them, and even less research on the effects on 
fetuses through the workers; therefore, the scientific research necessary to fully resolve a 
charge may not yet exist." Reproductive/Fetal Hazards, 92 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) 
§ 624.8 at 624:0010 (July 1986). 
95. See Williams, Firing the Woman, supra note 33, at 661 (effects of paternal envi· 
ronmental exposure infrequently studied; most scientific studies equate the child bearer 
with the source of defects in offspring by focusing almost exclusively on teratogenic ef-
fects); Bertin, Reproductive Hazards, supra note 33, at 280 ("adverse health effects of 
toxic chemicals are rarely confined to the fetus in utero.") 
The effects of these stereotypical notions still persist. See International Union, 
UA W v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989). In accepting Johnson Con-
trol's experts' arguments that animal studies did not demonstrate a possible risk of ge-
netic damage through male lead exposure, the court stated: 
... [T]he UA W has not presented any medical evidence in the 
record of any human study scientifically documenting genetic 
defects in human beings resulting from male lead exposure. It 
is this lack of convincing scientific data that the plaintiffs at-
tempt to gloss over and cast aside in ignoring the differences 
between the effect of lead on the human and animal reproduc-
tive systems. 
[d. at 889. If there is admittedly a paucity of research concerning effects of hazardous 
substances to male reproductive systems, see EEOC fetal protection guidelines, supra 
note 52, at D-2, it is unreasonable for a court to refuse to consider animal studies. 
It is interesting to note that the EEOC had negatively commented on the district 
court's decision in Johnson Controls in the recently promulgated EEOC fetal protection 
guidelines. See EEOC fetal protection guidelines, supra note 52, at D-4. Specifically, the 
EEOC stated that in International Union, UA W v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 
309 (E.D. Wisc. 1988), the district court had "concluded on summary judgment that the 
exclusionary policy was justified, despite the fact that, as we understand it, there was 
conflicting evidence about harm mediated through men. In the Commission's view, when 
conflicting evidence exists, summary judgment is not appropriate." See EEOC fetal pro-
tection guidelines, supra note 52, at 0-4. 
96. A woman's complement of ova may be damaged by toxins prior to conception. 
Reproductive/Fetal Hazards, 92 EEOC Com pI. Man. (BNA) § 624.2(f)(l) at 624:0002 
(July 1986). 
A woman and her fetus are susceptible to some environmental hazards during preg-
nancy. Fetal loss and malformations are the primary results if maternal exposure has 
occurred during the first trimester. Exposures during the second and third trimesters are 
more likely to be associated with shorter gestational length or low birth weight. Th, 
highest sensitivity of a fetus to exposure to teratogens, at least with regard to structural 
deviation, occurs during the period of organogenesis, from about days 18 to 20 until 
about days 55 to 60. See Reproductive Health Hazards in the Workplace, Office of 
Technology Assessment, Washington, D.C. (1985). 
The absolute peak of sensitivity may be reached before day 30 post-conception. As 
organogenesis is completed, susceptibility to anatomical defects diminishes greatly, but 
probably minor structural deviation is possible until histogenesis is completed late in the 
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susceptible97 to many toxins that harm their offspring and re-
productive capacities.98 
Reproductive health research tends to isolate women for 
study due to the "preconceived notion that there is an exclusive 
connection between birth defects and women who carry the off-
spring, ... "99 Additionally, the reproductive effects of occupa-
tional exposure on women are difficult to study due to the lack 
of standardized data collection systems. IOO Pre-existing data col-
fetal period. Deviations during the fetal period are more likely to involve growth or func-
tional aspects because these are the predominant developmental features at this time. 
See Faustman, Reproductive and Development Toxicology, at 11, in Working Women: 
Occupational Health Issues of the 1980s, supra note 93, (Apr. 19-20, 1988). 
97. Critical exposure to male reproductive capability generally occurs preconception, 
and may result in sterility, subfertility, depressed libido, impotence, defects in sperm 
integrity and miscarriage. See Selevan, The Dose-Response Fallacy in Human Repro-
ductive Studies of Toxic Exposure, 29 J. OccuP. MED., 451-54 (May 1987). Semen 
changes in male workers are not observed prior to 11 to 15 weeks after the first exposure. 
See Selevan, Design Considerations in Pregnancy Outcome Studies of Occupational 
Populations, 7 SCAND. J. WORK ENVIRON. HEALTH, supp!. 4: 76, 78 Fig. 1 (1981). 
98. Hazardous substances, physical agents, or conditions may affect the fetus di-
rectly through men in a number of ways. A man continually produces sperm cells 
throughout his fertile years (from puberty throughout his lifetime). A substance, physical 
agent, or condition can build up in the man's body so that it alters sperm cells as they 
are produced in such a way that, when one of them fertilizes a woman's ova, the resulting 
fetus is deformed or damaged and will either die before birth or be born with birth 
defects. Similarly, the hazard can alter the sperm cells present in the male at the time of 
exposure having the same effect. The hazard could affect the man in such a way that he 
can only produce (either temporarily or permanently) similarly defective sperm cells. See 
Reproductive/Fetal Hazards, 92 EEOC Comp!. Man. (BNA) § 624.2(f)(2) at 624:0002 
(July 1986). 
The ostensible goal of fetal protection policies is to protect the fetus. In large part 
utilization of these policies assumes that a fetus will survive to birth, and then be born 
with a birth defect for which it could sue its parents' employer. This may be one reason 
for excessive concentration on study of women, since a woman and her fetus are inextri-
cably bound until birth. However, exposure to men may result in an inability to even 
conceive, or may result in losing the fetus early in the pregnancy. See Bertin, Reproduc-
tive Hazards, supra note 33, at 280-82 and accompanying footnotes. Since these events 
are also likely to occur naturally in the general population, employer liability is not ques-
tioned and therefore the possibility that the harm was caused by male exposure is fre-
quently overlooked. 
99. Williams, Firing the Woman, supra note 33, at 660. See Timko, Exploring the 
Limits, supra note 61, at 166 ("[slcientific inquiry into reproductive hazards has focused 
on females, particularly those in male-dominated occupations.") 
100. For example, the most universal systems containing reproductive data are vital 
records systems. The data is limited by the completeness of the systems in terms of 
registration of the event (e.g., early fetal loss) and completeness of the registration of 
outcome (e.g., malformations, many of which are not detectable at birth). See Selevan, 
Linking Data to Study Reproductive Effects of Occupational Exposures, 1 OccuP. 
MEDICINE: STATE OF THE ART REVIEWS, 445 (July - Sept. 1986). 
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lection sources in the United States frequently provide inade-
quate or erroneous data. lol 
The fact that workers move in and out of exposure to toxins 
as their work schedules and duties change further inhibits accu-
rate study.lo2 Workers do not experience constant or equal risk 
during their reproductive cycles. lOS Factors such as workers' 
transfer between exposed and unexposed jobs affect the 
probability that a pregnancy between given partners will be 
"exposed. "104 
Many women who have successful live births may also stop 
working to remain at home, while those who experience early fe-
tal loss or infant death are more likely to return to work. IOIl Un-
less all women return to the same workplace after the termina-
tion of their pregnancy, an inflated proportion of reports of fetal 
loss and infant death can be expected as well as a reduced pro-
portion of reports of live births identified in both exposed and 
unexposed groups.I06 
The factors discussed above are examples of the difficulties 
researchers encounter in obtaining accurate results from repro-
ductive health studies. The bias and inaccuracy in gathering and 
101. See id. at 445-49. 
102. See Lemasters and Selevan, Use of Exposure Data in Occupational Reproduc-
tive Studies, 10 SCAND. J. WORK ENVIRON. HEALTH, 1, 3 (1984). 
103. Id. Adverse reproductive events caused by exposure to a toxicant may be asso-
ciated with individual idiosyncracies in absorption, metabolism, distribution, and excre-
tion that would not be reflected by ambient exposure measurements. Monitoring a par-
ticular reproductive event may, therefore, create gaps in the assignment of exposure 
doses during crucial periods of reproduction. See id. at 4. 
104. See Selevan, Design of Pregnancy Outcome Studies of Industrial Exposures, 
in OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS AND REPRODUCTION, 219, 222 (K. Hemminki, M. Sorsa, H. 
Vainio eds. 1985). 
105. Selevan, Design of Pregnancy Outcome Studies of Industrial Exposures, Oc-
CUPATIONAL HAZARDS AND REPRODUCTION, 219, 222 (1985). Most industry-based studies 
are retrospective and the current age of the population distribution affects the actual 
calendar time span covered by the study. Most industrial populations are of limited size: 
93.9 percent of the employers in the United States employ fewer than 100 workers. Id 
When female workers are studied, inclusion of terminated workers is mandatory to pre-
vent biased conclusions regarding certain pregnancy outcomes. Id. at 223. It is also un-
likely that when males are studied any negative outcome of a female partner's pregnancy 
will affect the male worker's employment status. Id. at 222. 
Early fetal loss or infant death could easily be related to male exposure. See supra 
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developing scientific evidence makes it inherently unreliable. 
Consequently, the EEOC's and OSHA's reliance upon flawed 
scientific evidence provides inadequate criteria upon which to 
judge discriminatory employer policies.l07 
4. Inadequate Federal Remedy 
The EEOC policy guidelines are of little assistance for preg-
nant women who are able to work but whose personal health or 
fetuses are at risk from hazards in the workplace. Under current 
federal guidelines, a pregnant woman does not have a mandatory 
right to transfer from a hazardous work environment. lOB 
Due to the temporary nature of pregnancy,109 the remedies 
offered by federal enforcement agencies are inadequate because 
a woman must lose her job or experience discrimination before 
she can seek a remedy.110 Should the EEOC grant a right to sue 
letter, a plaintiff faces difficult proof problems111 before she is 
107. The employer is given too much leeway to make policies which adversely affect 
a portion of the workforce, while purportedly relying on scientific study. This disparate 
impact is adverse to title VII's individualized treatment philosophy. See supra notes 31 
through 33 and accompanying text. 
108. See Reproductive/Fetal Hazards, 92 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 624.7(i) at 
624:0009 (July 1986) (whether or not an employer has considered alternatives to its ex-
clusionary policy is only a factor the EEOC considers during its investigation of discrimi-
natory practices; transfers are suggested, but not mandated, as examples of alternative 
practices). 
109. Limited by a nine-month gestational period. 
110. See EEOC fetal protection guidelines, supra note 52, at D-1 to D-4. The 
guidelines' articulated purpose is to provide "guidance for analyzing cases in which em-
ployers have limited women's employment opportunities by implementing sex-based 
policies alleged to protect against the risk of harm to employees' offspring from repro-
ductive or fetal hazards." [d. at D-1 (emphasis added). 
The EEOC investigates and conciliates charges of employment discrimination. See 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)-(d) (1982). If it is not possible to negotiate settlement between the 
worker and the employer, the EEOC issues a right to sue letter which grants the plaintiff 
a cause of action in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982). Consequently, 
title VII is enforced primarily through private action. Many pregnant women cannot af-
ford the expense in time or money that such litigation would require. Additionally, the 
right to sue is an ineffective remedy for a woman who desires to keep her job and not 
solely receive back pay. With administrative and judicial delay, by the time the private 
action remedy is provided, the pregnancy has ended. 
111. See Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. __ , __ , 109 S.Ct. 
__ , __ , 104 L.Ed.2d 733, 750-51 (1989) (plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion on 
the issue of disparate impact). Additionally, the EEOC regulations and compliance man-
ual rely upon scientifically biased evidence. See supra notes 91 through 107 and accom-
panying text. 
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granted relief. 
With ineffective federal remedies, individual states must be 
able to utilize common sense in formulating realistic solutions to 
the problem of discrimination against pregnant workers in toxic 
environments. Temporary transfer provisions, like Califor-
nia's,1I2 can achieve the goal of providing equal employment op-
portunities for pregnant women while simultaneously removing 
them from hazardous or toxic environments. Unfortunately, the 
mandatory provisions of California's law are presently inapplica-
ble to employers subject to title VII. 
5. Influence of Federal Law Despite FEHC Disapproval 
While the FEHC1I3 argues that federal resolution of the is-
sue of fetal protection is unpersuasive, California courts have 
nevertheless relied upon the federal rationale.1I4 Federal case 
law and EEOC fetal protection guidelines will have a potentially 
detrimental effect upon California law regarding fetal protection 
policies, despite the fact that the FEHC is under no obligation 
to follow federal precedent.llII The Commission gives careful 
consideration to title VII precedent when it is persuaded that it 
is a practical and appropriate guide for interpretation.1I6 In the 
112. See supra note 2 for text. 
113. The FEHC is the enforcing agency of California law which prohibits pregnancy 
discrimination. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12935(a) (West 1980 & Supp. 1989). 
114. See Johnson Controls v. California Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, No. 
G007029 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1988) (superior court remanded, finding that the Commis-
sion had erred as a matter of law for failing to consider the "business necessity" defense 
as set forth in Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984)). Opening 
Brief for Appellant Commission at 9, Johnson Controls v. California Fair Employment & 
Hous. Comm'n, No. G007029 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1988). However, the FEHC had consid-
ered the federal cases concerning fetal protection and "found them substantially wanting 
in analytical coherence and in consistency with settled principles of employment dis-
crimination law." [d. at 49. 
115. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. II, § 7285.l(d) (1985) provides in pertinent part: 
Except as required by the Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution, federal laws and their interpretations re-
garding discrimination in employment ... are not determina-
tive of the construction of those regulations and the California 
statutes which they interpret and implement but in the spirit 
of comity, shall be considered to the extent practical and 
appropriate. 
116. "Where Title VII precedent does not appear sound, however, or would conflict 
with the essential purposes of the Act, we may not and do not rely on it." Opening Brief 
for Appellant Commission at 11, Johnson Controls v. California Fair Employment & 
27
Norton: Employment Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1989
490 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:463 
fetal protection arena, however, the FEHC strongly disagrees 
with the application of the "business necessity" defense allowed 
by the court in Hayes. ll7 
The Commission's position is that fetal protection policies 
present fundamental policy questions and that "if an employer's 
voluntary undertaking of a fetal safety program is to outweigh 
the rights of women to equal employment opportunity then it is 
the Legislature, not the Commission, that must make that deci-
sion."llB The legislature has examined these issues and has pro-
vided for temporary transfer policies to protect California em-
ployees from pregnancy discrimination. Ho 
IV. RECENT UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN-
TERPRETATION OF THE PDA 
Although the Supreme Court's recent decision in California 
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra 120 does not directly ad-
Hous. Comm'n, No. G007029 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1988) (citing DFEH v. Church's Fried 
Chicken, FEHC Dec. No. 87-18 at 12 (1987)). 
117. In rejecting the federal attempt to justify an employer's good intentions in pro-
tecting the fetus the Commission has stated, " ... no case has ever ruled that a categori-
cal [sic] and intentional discrimination can be 'neutralized' by reference to the em-
ployer's purported purpose for the discrimination." Reply Brief for Appellant Com-
mission at 10, Johnson Controls v. California Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, No. 
G007029 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1988)(emphasis in original). The Commission had previ-
ously concluded that Globe Battery was not exempt from the "prohibitions against sex 
discrimination because it justified the discrimination as necessary to effectuate a volun-
tarily assumed responsibility for the protection of unborn offspring." Opening Brief for 
Appellant Commission at 2, Johnson Controls v. California Fair Employment & Hous. 
Comm'n, No. G007029 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1988). 
118. Opening Brief for Appellant Commission at 48, Johnson Controls v. California 
Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, No. G007029 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1988). 
119. See note 161 and accompanying text. 
120. 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (Marshall, J.) (CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) is not pre-
empted by title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, because 
it is not inconsistent with the purposes of the federal statute, and it does not require the 
doing of an act which is unlawful under title VII). California Federal, 479 U.S. at 292. 
Lillian Garland was employed by California Federal Savings and Loan Association 
(the bank), an employer subject to title VII. The bank maintained a facially neutral 
leave policy which allowed an employee, after three months service, to take an unpaid 
leave of absence with no guarantee of reinstatement, for a variety of reasons, including 
pregnancy and disability. After taking four months pregnancy disability leave, Ms. Gar-
land's request for reinstatement at the bank was denied. Ms. Garland filed a complaint 
with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing which issued an administrative 
accusation against the bank charging it had violated CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945(b)(2). Cal-
ifornia Federal, 479 U.S. at 278. 
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dress the issue of fetal protection policies, its logic and discus-
sion of Congressional intent In enacting the PDA 121 are 
instructive. 
California Federal buttresses this commenfs argument that 
title VII does not pre-empt state legislation aimed at accommo-
dating pregnancy as a characteristic unique to female employ-
ees.122 The opinion demonstrates the compatibility between title 
VII, as amended by the PDA, and the California provisions re-
quiring temporary transfers for pregnant workers. 123 
A. CASE DISCUSSION 
The operative issue in California Federal was whether the 
PDA, as part of the definition portion of title VII, prohibited 
states from requiring employers to reinstate pregnant workers, 
The California Fair Employment and Housing Commission, the state agency author-
ized by CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12935(a) to interpret the California Fair Employment and 
Housing Act, had construed the statute to require California employers subject to title 
VII, to reinstate an employee returning from pregnancy disability leave to the job she 
previously held, unless it was no longer available due to business necessity. If the posi-
tion was unavailable, the employer was required to make a reasonable, good faith effort 
to place the employee in a substantially similar job. California Federal, 479 U.S. at 276. 
Prior to the first FEHC hearing, the bank brought an action in the United States 
District Court for the Central District of California, seeking a declaration that the Cali-
fornia statute was inconsistent with and pre-empted by title VII, as amended by the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act. The bank sought an injunction against enforcement of 
the statute. Id. at 278-80. The district court granted the bank's motion for summary 
judgment and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The United States Supreme 
Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's opinion. Id. at 272. 
121. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), amending the definition 
portion of title VII, provides in relevant part: 
(k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" 
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and 
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-re-
lated purposes including receipt of benefits under fringe bene-
fit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in 
their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-
2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise .... 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). 
122. Accommodations include mandatory transfer provisions which would protect 
an individual woman's desire to simultaneously protect her fetus and her job. See infra 
notes 152 and 156 for discussion of California's legislative intent in providing such 
accommodation. 
123. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945 (West 1980). See infra notes 153 through 155 and 
accompanying text for discussion of compatibility. 
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regardless of their policy for disabled workers in general.124 The 
Court also resolved the issue of whether the second phrase l2& of 
the PDA afforded pregnant women unique treatment.126 
The Court held that in two specific sections of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, section 708127 and section 1104,128 Congress 
demonstrated that state laws would be pre-empted only if they 
actually conflicted with federal law. 129 The Court found the two 
sections severely limited title VII's pre-emptive effect.13o 
Relying on the PDA's legislative history,l3l the Court ruled 
Congress did not intend to prohibit preferential treatment. 132 
124. [d. at 283-84. 
125. California Federal, 479 U.S. at 284-85. The second phrase of the PDA is: 
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medi-
cal conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe 
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar 
in their ability or inability to work .... 
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982) (emphasis added). 
126. The debate was whether the PDA required pregnant women to be treated ex-
actly the same as people with similar ability to work, or whether it allowed pregnant 
women to be given special and preferential treatment. See Furnish, Beyond Protection: 
Releuant Difference and Equality in the Toxic Work Enuironment, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1, 4-6 (1987) (emphasis added). The bank had argued that the second clause of the 
PDA unambiguously rejected California's special treatment approach to pregnancy dis-
crimination. California Federal, 479 U.S. at 284. 
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7, § 708 (1982) provides: 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or re-
lieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punish-
ment provided by any present or future law of any State or 
political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which 
purports to require or permit the doing of any act which 
would be an unlawful employment practice under this 
subchapter. 
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4, § 1104 (1982) provides: 
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed 
as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the 
field in which any such title operates to the exclusion of State 
laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of 
this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State 
law unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the pur-
poses of this Act, or any provision thereof. 
129. California Federal, 479 U.S. at 281 (emphasis added). 
130. [d. at 282. 
131. [d. at 283-88. 
132. [d. at 287. The Ninth Circuit's earlier decision in this case provided the Court 
with useful insight about the "equal v. special treatment" debate. The Ninth Circuit 
recognizes that the California statute deals with a physical condition that is unique to 
women - pregnancy - rather than stereotypical notions about women as the more "quali-
30
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol19/iss3/3
1990] EMPLOYMENT LAW 493 
The Court stated California law and title VII, as amended by 
the PDA, shared the common purpose of promoting equal em-
ployment opportunity for women by removing barriers that op-
erated in the past to disfavor pregnant workers.133 
The Court adopted the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that Con-
gress intended the PDA to be "a floor beneath which pregnancy 
disability benefits may not drop - not a ceiling above which they 
may not rise."134 The Court also found the California statute was 
consistent with the dissent in Gilbert131i and that "[b]y 'taking 
pregnancy into account,' California's pregnancy disability-leave 
statute allows women, as well as men, to have families without 
losing their jobs. "136 
The Supreme Court recognized "the PDA does not 'demand 
that state law be blind to pregnancy's existence.' "137 In so stat-
ing the Court adopted "a realistic understanding of conditions 
found in today's labor environment. "138 The Court emphasized it 
would not allow employers to resort to archaic stereotypes re-
garding women's capabilities in the workplace.139 Additionally, 
the Court articulated that its decision allowed women to remain 
viable contributors to the workforce without forcing them to 
choose between their jobs and "the fundamental right to full 
participation in family life."140 
tied" parent. See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 395 (9th 
Cir. 1985), aff'd, 479 U.S. 272 (1987). 
133. California Federal, 479 U.S. at 288. 
134. [d. at 285 (1987), aff'g 758 F.2d 390, 396 (9th Cir. 1985). 
135. [d. at 289 (citing General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 159 (1976) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
136. [d. The Court added a caueat which may be interpreted to limit the decision's 
applicability to fetal protection cases. It emphasized that CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) 
was narrowly drawn to cover only the period of actual physical disability on account of 
pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions. California Federal, 479 U.S. at 290 
(emphasis in original). 
137. [d. at 280 (citing California Federal, 758 F.2d 390, 395 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
138. California Federal, 758 F.2d at 395 (quoting General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 
429 U.S. 125, 159 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Hazardous and toxic work environ-
ments are a prevalent part of today's labor environment. See generally supra note 54. 
139. California Federal, 479 U.S. at 290. 
140. [d. at 289 (quoting one of the Act's authors, Senator Williams, 123 Congo Rec. 
29658 (1977)) (emphasis added). It is important to emphasize that both forcing a preg-
nant worker to lose her job and exposing her fetus to hazardous conditions strip her of 
her fundamental right to full participation in family life. See California Federal, 479 
U.S. at 289. 
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V. CALIFORNIA LAW 
A. HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP TO PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION 
ACT 
In 1978, one month prior to the passage of the federal Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act,l41 the California legislature passed a 
statute guaranteeing certain employment rights to pregnant 
workers.142 The California statute contemplated the type of indi-
141. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1420.35, ch. 1321, Stats. of 1978 was chaptered on Septem-
ber 28, 1978. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act became law October 14, 1978. See supra 
note 30. The California bill prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of preg-
nancy was introduced to the California State Assembly by Assembly Majority Leader 
Howard Berman on May 18, 1977. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY, 1978 SUMMARY 
DIGEST at 1174. 
142. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945 (West 1980) (formerly CAL. LABOR CODE § 1420.35 
(West 1978)) states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless based 
upon a bona fide occupational qualification: 
(a) For any employer, because of the pregnancy, child-
birth, or related medical condition of any female employee, to 
refuse to promote her, or to refuse to select her for a training 
program leading to promotion, provided she is able to com-
plete the training program at least three months prior to the 
anticipated date of departure for her pregnancy leave, or to 
discharge her from employment or from a training program 
leading to promotion, or to discriminate against her in com-
pensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. 
(b) For any employer to refuse to allow a female employee 
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions either: 
(1) To receive the same benefits or privileges of employ-
ment granted by that employer to other persons not so af-
fected who are similar in their ability or inability to work, in-
cluding to take disability or sick leave or any other accrued 
leave which is made available by the employer to temporarily 
disabled employees. For purposes of this section, pregnancy, 
childbirth, and related medical conditions are treated as any 
other temporary disability. However, no employer shall be re-
quired to provide a female employee disability leave on ac-
count of normal pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical con-
dition for a period exceeding six weeks. Nothing in this section 
shall be construed to require an employer to provide his or her 
employees with health insurance coverage for the medical 
costs of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. 
The inclusion in any such health insurance coverage of any 
provisions or coverage relating to medical costs of pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall not be con-
strued to require the inclusion of any other provisions or cov-
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vidualized treatment title VII demands/43 allowing a pregnant 
employee, in conjunction with her physician, to make her own 
decisions about her employment. The California statute pro-
vided that a pregnant woman could request and obtain a trans-
fer144 in situations in which she and her physician felt that she 
erage, nor shall coverage of any related medical conditions be 
required by virtue of coverage of medical costs of pregnancy, 
childbirth, or other related medical conditions. 
(2) To take a leave on account of pregnancy for a reasona-
ble period of time; provided, such period shall not exceed four 
months. Such employee shall be entitled to utilize any accrued 
vacation leave during this period of time. Reasonable period of 
time means that period during which the female employee is 
disabled on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medi-
cal conditions. Nothing herein shall be construed to limit the 
provisions of paragraph (1) of subdivision (b). 
An employer may require any employee who plans to take 
a leave pursuant to this subdivision to give the employer rea-
sonable notice of the date such leave shall commence and the 
estimated duration of such leave. 
(c)(l) For an employer who has a policy, practice, or col-
lective-bargaining agreement requiring or authorizing the 
transfer of temporarily disabled employees to less strenuous or 
hazardous positions for the duration of the disability to refuse 
to transfer a pregnant female employee who so requests. 
(2) For any employer to refuse to temporarily transfer a 
pregnant female employee to a less strenuous or hazardous po-
sition for the duration of her pregnancy if she so requests, 
with the advice of her physician, where such transfer can be 
reasonably accommodated, provided, however, that no em-
ployer shall be required by this section to create additional 
employment which the employer would not otherwise have 
created, nor shall such employer be required to discharge any 
employee, transfer any employee with more seniority, or pro-
mote any employee who is not qualified to perform the job. 
(d) This section shall not be construed to affect any other 
provision of law relating to sex discrimination or pregnancy. 
(e) The provisions of this section, except paragraph (2) of 
subdivision (b), shall be inapplicable to any employer subject 
to Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Subsection (e) is the replacement subsection. See infra note 150 for its original 
wording as subsection four. 
143. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1970) ("What is required by Con-
gress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when 
the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermis-
sible classifications.") 
144. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945 (1) § 12945(1)-(2) (West 1980). A transfer to a less 
strenuous or hazardous environment is not the perfect solution, because the physician 
upon whose advice the woman relies, may also be operating from misinformation or lack 
of knowledge regarding the effects of workplace hazards during or before pregnancy. See 
supra note 40 and accompanying text. However, until workplace environments are made 
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risked personal danger or jeopardy of fetal exposure to 
hazards. 1411 
California legislators mistakenly146 feared pre-emption of 
the entire statute guaranteeing rights to pregnant employeesH7 
by the then pending amendments to title VII.14s On the last day 
safe for all workers, a transfer option is the optimal practical interim solution. 
145. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945(c)(1) 12945(c)(1)-(2) (West 1980) states in pertinent 
part: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless based 
upon a bona fide occupational qualification: 
(c)(l) For an employer who has a policy, practice, or col-
lective-bargaining agreement requiring or authorizing the 
transfer of temporarily disabled employees to less strenuous or 
hazardous positions for the duration of the disability to refuse 
to transfer a pregnant female employee who so requests. 
(2) For any employer to refuse to temporarily transfer a 
pregnant female employee to a less strenuous or hazardous po-
sition for the duration of her pregnancy if she so requests, 
with the advice of her physician, where such transfer can be 
reasonably accommodated, provided, however, that no em-
ployer shall be required by this section to create additional 
employment which the employer would not otherwise have 
created, nor shall such employer be required to discharge any 
employee, transfer any employee with more seniority, or pro-
mote any employee who is not qualified to perform the job. 
See also .supra note 9 for the FEHC's interpretations and regulations regarding these 
su bsections. 
146. See supra notes 111 through 131 and accompanying text for discussion of Su-
preme Court's holding in California Federal, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (the PDA was not in-
tended to pre-empt similar state statutes). 
147. Memorandum from Christine Curtis, Dep't of Indus. ReI. Staff Counsel, to As-
sembly Majority Leader Howard Berman, Author of A.B. 1960 (Sept. 14, 1978) (AB 1960; 
Veto or Sign?). 
148. The amendments became the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, P.L. 95-
555, 78 Stat. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)). 
In a memorandum explaining the anticipated effects of the addition of subsection 4 
to A.B. 1960 Christine Curtis, Dep't of Indus. ReI. Staff Counsel, stated: 
the recently-enacted pregnancy law, AB 1960 Assemblyman 
Berman, provides that if federal pregnancy legislation amend-
ing Title VII is enacted, then the State of California [sic 1 ju-
risdiction of pregnancy rights of employees of employers of 15 
or more passes to the federal EEOC except for enforcement of 
equal pay, of hiring and of the 4-month unpaid leave policy. 
Such a bill passed Congress in October, 1978 and this is before 
President Carter. The FEP would continue to enforce ... the 
rights of all pregnant employees of employers of between 5 
and 15 employees .... 
C. Curtis, Pregnancy Employment Rights at 3 (1978) (available at Golden Gate Univer-
sity School of Law library). 
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of the California legislative session149 the author, Assembly Ma-
jority Leader Howard L. Berman, added a new sectionlllO which 
severely limited California's ability to implement preventative 
alternatives and to shield pregnant employees of title VII em-
ployers11l1 from discriminatory fetal protection policies. 11l2 
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CALIFORNIA STATUTE GRANTING 
EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS TO PREGNANT WORKERS 
California's statutory protection of pregnant employeeslll3 
demonstrates that the temporary transfer provisions in the stat-
ute are compatible with the purpose and provisions of the PDA. 
See supra notes 60 through 79 and accompanying text for discussion of undesirabil-
ity and ineffectiveness of EEOC enforcement. 
149. The subsection was added August 31, 1978, and the bill was enrolled Septem-
ber ll, 1978. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY, 1978 SUMMARY DIGEST, at ll74. 
150. Article 4, section four was added to A.B. 1960. It provided: 
SEC. 4. In the event Congress enacts legislation amending Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit sex discrimi-
nation on the basis of pregnancy, the provisions of this act, 
except paragraph (2) of the subdivision (b) of Section 1420.35 
of the Labor Code, shall be inapplicable to any employer sub-
ject to such federal law, except that this section shall not per-
tain to complaints filed prior to the effective date of this act. 
Assembly Bill No. 1960, Amended in Conference, Assembly, August 31, 1978; Senate, 
August 3, 1978 at 6 (emphasis added). 
Later, the author stated that subsection four of A.B. 1960: 
reflected an agreement between proponents and opponents of 
the bill, and the author, that if pending federal legislation re-
garding sex discrimination as it related to pregnancy did go 
into effect, AB 1960 would not be applicable to those employ-
ers subject to federal law upon its effective date with the ex-
ception of AB 1960's provision on [sic] four months pregnancy 
leave. 
Summary of A.B. 121 (1979 Session) Clean-Up Bill to A.B. 1960. Howard L. Berman, 
Assembly Majority Leader (A.B. 121, Author's File, 1979) at 1 (available at Golden Gate 
University School of Law library). 
151. Employers with 15 or more employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b} (1982). See 
supra note 6 for federal definition of employer. 
152. Women are denied the right to individual mandatory transfer and maintenance 
of their jobs and are subject to termination before they can seek a meaningful remedy. 
As noted previously, EEOC remedies become available only after discrimination occurs. 
See supra notes 108 through ll2 and accompanying text. Additionally, the guidelines 
rely on biased scientific evidence and are therefore ineffective. See supra notes 91 
through 107 and accompanying text. 
153. See supra note 142 for text of CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945(c)(l} 12945(c)(I}-(2} 
(West 1980); see also supra note 9 for text of the CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS 
sections which implement the statute. Local California agencies are in a proximate posi-
tion to provide more effective enforcement. 
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One of the articulated purposes of the statutellH was to amelio-
rate the effects of the United States Supreme Court decision in 
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert. IIIII 
The expressed intent of A.B. 1960 was: 
A.B. 1960 thus remedies pregnancy discrimination 
on the job. The bill recognizes that women are a 
legitimate part of the primary work force and 
must not be disadvantaged by temporary incapac-
ity to work due to pregnancy. Now, the employ-
ment structure by both private and public em-
ployers frequently avoids protection of pregnant 
employees. A.B. 1960 is an important step by the 
California Legislature to eliminate this glaring 
discrepancy between the employment treatment 
of men and women, based solely on the reality 
that, while both sexes can be parents, one sex car-
ries the child and has, as a result, been placed in 
a less responsible portion of the work force. IDS 
154. Sponsors of the new California statute prohibiting pregnancy discrimination 
Bought to clarify legislative intent "to correct what was viewed as the Supreme Court's 
misinterpretation of the ban on sex discrimination as it related to pregnancy." Howard 
L. Berman, Assembly Majority Leader (Pregnancy Discrimination and Pregnancy Bene-
fits - A Brief History) (A.B. 121, Author's File, 1979) at l. 
While federal and state anti-discrimination guidelines barred 
any different treatment of pregnant workers in regards to sick 
time, leave of absense [sic], seniority rights, and insurance and 
other benefits, the U.S. Supreme Court in a decision last year, 
Gilbert v. G.E., (429 U.S. 125), ruled that an exclusion of preg-
nancy-related disabilities from an employee disability benefit 
plan did not constitute gender-based discrimination absent a 
showing that the exclusion was designed to cause invidious 
discrimination against one sex over the other. 
This measure would overcome the current court rulings by 
naming pregnant employees as a protected class and requiring 
employers to treat them in a prescribed way concerning ma-
ternity leave, benefits, and disability and health insurance. 
Employment Discrimination Based on Pregnancy: Hearing on A.B. 1960 Before the As-
sembly Committee on Labor, Employment and Consumer Affairs (Jan. 11, 1978) at 1-2 
(memorandum on A.B. 1960) (available at Golden Gate University School of Law 
library). 
155. 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (an otherwise comprehensive disability insurance plan did 
not violate title VII prohibition against sex discrimination even though it failed to cover 
pregnancy related disabilities). 
156. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION OF CALIFORNIA, LL ANALYSIS TO THE SENATE 
COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, at 5 (Jan. 17, 1978) (emphasis added). 
California enacted AB 1960 to statutorily define certain preg-
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The bill was explicitly to comply with the California Supreme 
Court holding in Sail'er Inn, Inc. u. Kirby 157 mandating women 
not be accorded second class status and women be allowed to 
participate in the workforce. 158 
Mandatory transfer provisions159 were a crucial part of A.B. 
1960160 from the bill's inception.16l The provisions provided that 
nancy provisions in FEP law as minimum protections for fe-
male employees .... It was the intent of AB 1960 to expand 
protections and benefits to all workers affected by pregnancy, 
yet not set a limit on what constitutes pregnancy discrimina-
tion as contained in FEPC sex discrimination regulations. 
Howard L. Berman, Assembly Majority Leader (Pregnancy Discrimination and Preg-
nancy Benefits - A Brief History) (A.B. 121, Author's File, 1979) at 2 (emphasis in origi-
nal) (available at Golden Gate University School of Law library). 
"The female employee is thus to receive as much protection as possible and she is 
not to be treated as any other employees in all circumstances, basically as she varies 
from other workers in that she is carrying a child." Memorandum from Christine Curtis, 
Dep't of Indus. ReI. Staff Counsel, to Assembly Majority Leader Howard Berman, Au-
thor of A.B. 1960 (Mar. 22, 1978) at 2 (proposed amendments to A.B. 1960). 
See also Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1219, 1229-31 (discussing the severe economic impact on individual women fired 
under fetal protection policies and noting that without good medical care during preg-
nancy a fetus may actually face higher risks as result of maternal unemployment than 
had the woman remained in the "hazardous" environment). 
157. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 22, 485 P.2d 529, 542, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 342 (1971) (a California 
statute prohibiting most women from serving as bartenders was unconstitutional and 
violated CAL. CONST., art. XX, § 18 (now CAL. CONST., art. I, § 8». A person may not be 
disqualified. because of gender from entering or pursuing a lawful business, vocation, or 
profession. Sail'er Inn, 5 Cal. 3d at 22. Such discrimination violates the equal protection 
clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Id. The court used "strict" scrutiny to 
conclude that sexual classifications, made with respect to a fundamental interest such as 
employment, are suspect. Id. at 20. 
158. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION OF CALIFORNIA, LL ANALYSIS TO THE SENATE 
COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS at 2 (Jan. 17, 1978). 
159. See supra note 142 for text of the transfer provisions codified at CAL. GOV'T 
CODE § 12945(c)(1) and (2) (West 1980). 
160. One memorandum in support of the bill stated: 
[t]his provision would help women working in such industry 
[sic] as lead plants where exposure to lead could harm the fe-
tus and would provide an alternative to the total exclusion of 
women working in such industry. AB 1960 thus guarantees 
that a pregnant employee achieve the best working conditions 
possible if the job is potentially damaging to the unborn child, 
that a pregnant employee be able to establish her own reason-
able time off to have the child, and that she be entitled to the 
same economic support during her absence available to other 
employees. 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION OF CALIFORNIA, LL ANALYSIS TO THE SENATE COMMIT-
TEE ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS at 2 (Jan. 17, 1978) (emphasis added). 
161. The bill was first introduced on May 18, 1977. See 1978 CAL. LEGIS. SUMM. DIG. 
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an employer must accommodate the working conditions of a 
pregnant employee whose job was strenuous or hazardous by 
transferring her, upon her request, to safer tasks for the dura-
tion of her pregnancy.182 The provision mandated transfer upon 
request when the transfer could be accommodated without un-
due economic hardship to the employer.183 
An examination of the legislative history demonstrates that 
the mandatory transfer section of the California pregnancy dis-
crimination statute was designed to protect pregnant women 
during employment. The legislators were specifically concerned 
with safeguarding women from dangers posed by hazards in the 
workplace and wanted to provide safety without forcing a preg-
nant employee to lose her job. This approach was significantly 
more availing than the federal government's focus on private 
right of action.184 
C. WHY THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE INVALIDATED MOST OF 
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945 AS TO TITLE VII EMPLOYERS 
1. A.B. 1960 
The authors of the California pregnancy discrimination bill 
were aware of the existence of similar pending federal legislation 
early in A.B. 1960's history.1811 Initially, they felt that their ef-
ch. 1321. 
162. See supra note 145. One Enrolled Bill report recommending that Governor 
Brown sign the bill stated: 
[A.B. 1960) also initiates reasonable relief for pregnant women 
who are working in hazardous and/or strenuous occupa~ions so 
that they will not further expose their fetus [sic) to danger 
during the pregnancy. This provision is a partial response to 
federal OSHA concerns about women in such industries (such 
as lead plants) and heads off an attempt to prohibit all women 
of childbearing age from working in these industries. 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION OF CALIFORNIA, ENROLLED BILL REPORT at 3 (Sept. 26, 
1978). 
163. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION OF CALIFORNIA, LL ANALYSIS TO THE SENATE 
COMMITIEE ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS at 1 (Jan. 17, 1978). 
164. See supra notes 108 through 112 and accompanying text. 
165. "Congress just (in the spring of 1977) responded to this December 7, 1976 Su-
preme Court Decision [General Electric Co. v. Gilbert) by introducing S995 and HR5055 
to amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 .... AB 1960 is the corresponding 
California legislative response to that recent Supreme Court action .... " INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS COMMISSION OF CALIFORNIA, LL ANALYSIS TO THE SENATE COMMITIEE ON IN-
DUSTRIAL RELATIONS at 2-3 (Jan. 17, 1978). 
38
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol19/iss3/3
1990] EMPLOYMENT LAW 501 
forts were consistent with the federal legislation. 166 However, the 
original wording of the mandatory transfer sections engendered 
vocal employer opposition.167 
It appears the opposition from Kaiser SteeP68 caused the 
legislators to eventually doubt the legitimacy of the bill in light 
166. Christine Curtis, Counsel, Dep't of Indus. ReI. urged that the transfer provision 
of subsection (c) was consistent with the federal provisions. 
This specific provision would be deemed to be included in the 
federal provisions. The transfer formula provided in AB 1960 
accords with the general Title VII and other civil rights cases 
pertaining to work force placement remedies for past 
discrimination. 
C. Curtis, Pregnancy Employment Rights at 11 (1978) (available at Golden Gate Univer-
sity School of Law library). 
The California Legislature is thus following the lead of the 
New York highest court in determining that the United States 
Supreme Court cannot dictate a state's policy as to pregnancy 
benefits coverage; it is following the lead of Congress in specif-
ically mandating that it is legislative intent that there be no 
discrimination for pregnancy; and it is following the lead of 
the California Supreme Court that there be no second class 
treatment of women, especially of issues affecting the partici-
pation of women in the work force. 
The California Legislature, further, would be following 
and expanding its own efforts to eliminate employment dis-
crimination on the basis of pregnancy .... These sections 
clearly indicate that the California State Legislature has con-
sidered pregnancy and that substantial precedence exists for 
protecting pregnant and working women and for providing 
more complete coverage. 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION OF CALIFORNIA, LL ANALYSIS TO THE SENATE COMMIT-
TEE ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS at 3-4 (Jan. 17, 1978) (available at Golden Gate University 
School of Law library). 
167. The California Seed Association objected that the "transferral of pregnant em-
ployees to less strenuous or hazardous positions .... is in complete conflict with the 
seniority system. Employees who have worked long and hard with the hope of promotion 
may be bypassed for promotion merely to accommodate the transfer of a pregnant fe-
male due to this provision." Letter from California Seed Association to the Members of 
the Industrial Relations Commission (Apr. 4, 1978) (objecting to A.B. 1960) (available at 
Golden Gate University School of Law library). 
The California Manufacturers Association said with regard to employee transfers, 
"[t]his subdivision also implies that all employers are callous, and unsensitive [sic] to 
their employee's [sic] needs. Surely, common sense would say that any employer would 
transfer a pregnant employee to a less strenuous job, if it is possible to do so." Memoran-
dum by California Manufacturers Association at 4 (Apr. 4, 1978) (providing a critical 
analysis of A.B. 1960) (available at Golden Gate University School of Law library). The 
Association recommended deletion of subdivision (c) in its entirety. [d. 
168. Letter from Kaiser Steel Corporation to Casey Young, Chief Consultant, Indus-
trial Relations Commission of California at 1-2 (Apr. 5, 1978) (opposing A.B. 1960) 
(available at Golden Gate University School of Law library). 
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of pending federal legislation.16B In disagreeing with the 
mandatory transfer section, Kaiser argued that the "[u]nilateral 
right of [a] pregnant employee to transfer to [a] 'less strenuous 
or hazardous position' disrupts collective bargaining agreements, 
and could initiate discrimination charges under Title VII of 
EEOC Guidelines."17o Kaiser objected to what it characterized 
as the subsection's creation of a "super-protected class within an 
already protected class"l71 and the appearance that the pro-
tected class was afforded "preferential treatment."172 Kaisersug-
gested that as the statute provided a gender-related benefit, it 
must fail because it conflicted with federal law.173 
As a result of opposition the bill's author added section four 
in the final days of the session.17• With the pre-emptive c;;ection 
appended, l7Ci many proponents withdrew support and advocated 
that Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. refuse to sign the bill.176 
169. S. 995 and H.R. 5055 were pending in Congress. The bills were later consoli-
dated as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k) (1982). 
170. Letter from Kaiser Steel Corporation to Casey Young, Chief Consultant, Indus-
trial Relations Commission of California at 1 (Apr. 5, 1978) (opposing A.B. 1960) (availa-
ble at Golden Gate University School of Law library). 
171. Id. 
172. Id. Kaiser Steel further objected that subsection (c): 
discriminates against all non-pregnant employees, who may 
therefore be bumped from their jobs, which they have ac-
quired through seniority or ability, solely because they are not 
pregnant. Since only female employees can become pregnant, 
this bill is possibly violative of the discrimination provisions 
of Title VII, as it provides a benefit that is necessarily gender-
related. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
This characterization was found by the dissent in Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) to be 
faulty and was the express reason for the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. 
See California Federal, 479 U.S. at 277 n.6. 
173. Letter from Kaiser Steel Corporation to Casey Young, Chief Consultant, Indus-
trial Relations Commission of California at 2 (Apr. 5, 1978) (opposing A.B. 1960) (availa-
ble at Golden Gate University School of Law library). 
174. See supra notes 149 through 152 and accompanying text. 
175. "The main objection to the signing of A.B. 1960 is § 4, the federal preemption 
of state legislation as to employers covered by federal legislation, should the federal bill 
pass . ... " Memorandum from Christine Curtis, Dep't of Indus. ReI. Staff Counsel, to 
Assembly Majority Leader Howard Berman, Author of A.B. 1960 (Sept. 14, 1978) (AB 
1960; Veto or Sign?) (emphasis in original) (available at Golden Gate University School 
of Law library). 
176. One Enrolled Bill Report warned, 
Some of the trade-offs apparent in this bill make it impossible 
to know with any certainty whether the law will provide the 
protections described. For example, the amendment added in 
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Despite withdrawn support,177 A.B. 1960 was enrolled with the 
exemption for title VII employers intact. It was presented to and 
signed by Governor Brown on September 28, 1978.178 
2. A.B. 121 
Two months after A.B. 1960 had been chaptered, its author, 
Assemblyman Berman, introduced a new bill to "clean up" the 
statute granting employment rights to pregnant women.179 The 
bill only amended section four of the statute.180 The articulated 
Section 4 of AB 1960 provides that if Congress enacts legisla-
tion amending Title VII to prohibit discrimination on the ba-
sis of pregnancy, the provisions of AB 1960 (with certain lim-
ited exceptions) shall be inapplicable to any employer subject 
to federal law. 
California residents are, therefore, stripped of the possibility 
of achieving protections under the California Fair Employ-
ment Practice Act and are subject to the vicissitudes of Title 
VII law as interpreted by the Burger Supreme Court. The 
trend of that court is clear and it would be indeed unfortunate 
if California lost the ability to provide protections to women 
under state law when it is possible for our state courts to pro-
vide much more progressive, comprehensive and forceful pro-
tection. This amendment is too high a price to pay for this 
legislation. 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION OF CALIFORNIA, ENROLLED BILL REPORT at 1-2 (Sept. 
11, 1978) (A.B. 1960) (available at Golden Gate University School of Law library). 
177. The Fair Employment Practice Commission requested that Assemblyman 
Berman kill A.B. 1960 as amended. Representatives of various California agencies met 
with him to discuss their concerns. Later they stated: 
If after weighing the issues raised ... you determine to con-
tinue your support of this bill, then we will enforce the law 
according to the provisions of AB 1960 as forcefully and as 
intelligently as possible. In short, the law you so effectively 
sponsored, if signed by the Governor, will not be victim to 
half-hearted enforcement or lukewarm implementation. 
Letter from David A. Garcia and Alice A. Lytle to Howard L. Berman (Sept. 19, 1978) 
(discussing A.B. 1960) (available at Golden Gate University School of Law library). 
178. 1978 CAL. LEGIS. SUMM. DIG. ch. 1321, CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY at 
1174. The Secretary of State chaptered the bill on September 18, 1978. 
179. 1979 CAL. LEGIS. SUMM. DIG. ch. 13, CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY at 146. 
The bill also addressed portions of CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2626.2 to eliminate inconsis-
tencies between it and CAL. LABOR CODE § 1420.35 (West 1978). [d. Assembly Majority 
Leader Howard L. Berman introduced A.B. 121 on December 12, 1978. 
180. The clarifying language read: "The provisions of this section, except paragraph 
(2) of subdivision (b), shall be inapplicable to any employer subject to Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964." CAL. LABOR CODE § 1420.35(e) (West 1978). 
Section four had been added to A.B. 1960 on the last day of the session as a result of 
employer opposition. It is conceivable that the author had little time to research the 
consequences or necessity of the addition. The California legislature did not know if the 
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purpose of the amending legislation lSI was to clarify the applica-
bility of A.B. 1960 with respect to those employers subject to 
federal law. ls2 The clean-up amendment was added solely be-
cause the PDA had passed. ISS There is no indication that the 
federal legislation would pass and, if it did, what it would provide. In fact it was poten-
tially a violation of the California Constitution to accede enforcement power to the fed-
eral government. See infra note 183. 
181. Howard L. Berman, Assembly Majority Leader, stated: 
The intent of Section 4 was to provide that upon Congres-
sional enactment of an amendment to Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting sex discrimination on the basis 
of pregnancy, AB 1960 would be inapplicable to those employ-
ers subject to such federal law, upon the federal law's effective 
dates. 
It was not known at the time AB 1960 was passed that the 
federal legislation pending would pass or that if it did pass, it 
would have two effective dates. The confusion resulting from 
this fact is addressed and hopefully clarified by the clean-up 
bill, AB 121. 
Assembly Majority Leader Howard Berman, Summary of A.B. 1960, ch. 1321 of 1978 at 6 
(1978) (emphasis in original) (available at Golden Gate University School of Law 
library). 
The only section directly affecting the Fair Employment Prac-
tice Act is Section 1420.35(e) of the proposed legislation, 
which clarifies the Legislature's intent to exempt employers 
with 15 or more employees from all but one provision of the 
state law governing discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 
Because federal legislation amending Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Acts was not passed until after the state law was 
signed, such clarification was necessary. 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION OF CALIFORNIA, ENROLLED BILL REPORT for A.B. 121 
(Mar. 20, 1979) (available at Golden Gate University School of Law library). 
182. Summary of A.B. 121 (1979 Session) Clean-Up Bill to A.B. 1960 .. Howard L. 
Berman, Assembly Majority Leader. See supra note 6 for federal definition of employer. 
The amending legislation provided: 
Specifically, the bill: 
(2) Exempts employers of 15 or more persons from the state 
discrimination prohibitions covering pregnancy leave, except 
that reasonable leave up to four months is retained in the cur-
rent law and, [sic) recognizes the federal law prohibiting em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 
Assembly Third Reading, A.B. 121, revised Feb. 5, 1979, Assembly Office of Research. 
183. "Language contained in AB 1960 making most of its provisions inapplicable to 
employers subject to the federal Civil Rights Act (employers with 15 or more employees) 
if that act is amended to include provisions relating to pregnancy discrimination is re-
written to reflect the fact that such legislation was in fact enacted." Senate Industrial 
Relations Committee, Bill Analysis of A.B. 121 (Berman) as amended January 18, 1979 
at 4. (Feb. 20, 1979). 
The amendment also remedied a potentially unconstitutional delegation of power. 
Although it is valid for state legislatures to adopt existing statutes, rules or regulations 
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legislators gave renewed thought or research into the possible ef-
fects of subsection (e). 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that in adding subsec-
tion (e) to the pregnancy discrimination statute the legislature 
acted prematurely and without sufficient contemplation of the 
consequences of adding the invalidating portion of the section. 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION 
ACT AND CALIFORNIA STATUTE CAN COEXIST 
In light of the interpretation given to the second clause of 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act by the United States Su-
preme Court in California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. 
Guerra it is now possible to see that the California legislature's 
fear of pre-emption of CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945 was premature. 
The statute does not conflict with or malign the purpose of the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act in any way. In fact, both are com-
pletely complementary. The California statute shares a common 
goal with title VII: ensuring that women, like men, are assured 
of full participation in the job market and in family life. How-
. ever, unlike the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the California 
statute has been interpreted by the FEHC to provide on-the-job 
rights to pregnant workers and to put decisions regarding preg-
nancy into the hands of the individuals to whom they belong. 
of Congress or another state, by reference, the attempt to make future regulations of 
another jurisdiction part of the state law is generally held to be an unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative power in violation of the California Constitution. Brock v. Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County, 9 Cal. 2d 291, 297, 71 P.2d 209, 212-13 (1937) (citing In re 
Burke, 190 Cal. 326, 328, 211 P. 193, 193-94 (1923) (legislation which adopted future 
provision of an existing act would be void». 
At the time Section 4 was agreed upon, it was not known: 1) 
That the two federal bills pending in the Senate House Con-
ference Committee would be reported out of the conference 
committee as one compromise version. (There was major disa-
greement between the two houses with respect to abortion lan-
guage). 2) That if a compromise version was reported out, 
both the Senate and the House would adopt that version. 3) 
That the President would sign the federal legislation as en-
acted by both houses. 4) That there would be two effective 
dates. All of the four developments listed above which were 
either the subject of speculation or not foreseen at all when 
AB 1960 was passed, did in fact take place. 
Summary of A.B. 121 (1979 Session) Clean-Up Bill to A.B. 1960. Howard L. Berman, 
Assembly Majority Leader (emphasis added). 
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As enforced, the provisions of title VII have proven ineffec-
tive in ensuring freedom from employment discrimination for 
women. This is particularly true in the context of pregnant 
women working in potentially hazardous environments. The 
United States Supreme Court has stated that in enacting the 
PDA Congress had no intention of occupying the entire field of 
granting employment rights to pregnant women. California 
should therefore be free to extend CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945 to 
protect the health and employment opportunities of all pregnant 
workers within the state by deleting subsection (e). 
Concededly, the ideal solution to problems allegedly ad-
dressed by the use of by fetal protection policies would be to 
eliminate toxins and hazards from workplaces. Until that occurs, 
however, a pregnant woman in California must be allowed to 
utilize her statutory right to transfer to a less strenuous or haz-
ardous position upon her physician's recommendation. Title VII 
employers must be subject to this provision to preserve the 
spirit of both title VII and California law. 
Constance Norton* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989. 
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